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Article 
Delinking Reimbursement 
Rachel E. Sachs†  
  INTRODUCTION   
Recently, scholars and policymakers on both sides of the 
aisle have become interested in the legal and regulatory struc-
tures surrounding pharmaceutical approval and reimbursement 
in this country. Scholars focusing on the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) have considered the ways in which it ought to 
regulate emerging technologies,1 debated the optimal level of ev-
idence required for approval,2 and explored the ways in which 
 
†  Associate Professor, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. 
For their extremely thoughtful comments, I would like to thank Bob Bohrer, 
Erin Fuse Brown, Glenn Cohen, Nicholson Price, Liz Sepper, Patti Zettler, and 
the participants in Minnesota Law Review’s 2017 Symposium, the 2017 ASLME 
Conference, the 2017 Wiet Life Sciences Conference, Harvard Law School’s Pe-
trie-Flom Center Health Law Workshop, the Seattle University School of Law 
faculty workshop, the St. Louis University School of Law faculty workshop, and 
Stanford Law School’s 2018 BioLaw Conference. Disclosure: the author is a 
member of the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review’s Midwest Compara-
tive Effectiveness Public Advisory Council. Copyright © 2018 by Rachel E. 
Sachs. 
 1. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 421 (2017) (proposing a disclosure-based regulatory regime 
for medical algorithms); Rachel E. Sachs & Carolyn A. Edelstein, Ensuring the 
Safe and Effective FDA Regulation of Fecal Microbiota Transplantation, 2 J.L. 
BIOSCIENCES 396 (2015) (examining the challenges of regulating fecal microbi-
ota transplantation as a biologic drug); Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Reg-
ulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discuss-
ing the need for regulation to keep up with new, synthetic substances). 
 2. Compare Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Approving a Problematic 
Muscular Dystrophy Drug: Implications for FDA Policy, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
2357 (2016) (arguing that the FDA approved the drug eteplirsen prematurely), 
with Vahid Montazerhodjat & Andrew W. Lo, Is the FDA Too Conservative or 
Too Aggressive?: A Bayesian Decision Analysis of Clinical Trial Design (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21499, 2015) (using Bayesian 
analysis to demonstrate that the FDA can be overly conservative regarding 
drugs that treat life-threatening illnesses). 
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pharmaceutical companies seek to game various FDA require-
ments to extend their patent monopolies.3 Scholars focusing on 
reimbursement have argued that existing payment systems do 
not provide optimal incentives to payers or providers,4 and have 
examined the relationship between insurance regulation and pa-
tient costs for new drugs.5 
In the policy arena, efforts like the 21st Century Cures Act6 
claim to modernize the FDA, encouraging agency officials to 
think carefully about the development of new healthcare tech-
nologies in an age of personalized medicine.7 At the same time, 
concerns about the ever-increasing prices of drugs have led to a 
host of proposals for reform, some wholesale8 and some piece-
meal.9 Although legislators have yet to take meaningful action 
to lower drug prices on the federal level, state legislators have 
 
 3. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, 
Late-Filed, and at-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305 (2016) (exposing the po-
tential for citizen petitions to be used to extend brand monopolies by delaying 
generic approval); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Gener-
ation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499 (2016) (de-
scribing how pharmaceutical companies take advantage of nuances in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to hold off generic competition); Jordan Paradise, REMS as 
a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?, 
15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43 (2015) (describing how FDA risk evaluation 
and mitigation strategies are used to inhibit generic competition). 
 4. See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 119 (June 2016), 
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/june-2016-report-to-the 
-congress-medicare-and-the-health-care-delivery-system.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [herein-
after MEDPAC] (proposing adjustments to Part B payments to change incen-
tives); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016) 
(discussing the potential for prescription drug insurance to remedy distortions 
in the patent system that have led to the underdevelopment of drugs). 
 5. See, e.g., Stacie B. Dusetzina et al., Association of Prescription Drug 
Price Rebates in Medicare Part D with Patient Out-of-Pocket and Federal Spend-
ing, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1185, 1185–86 (2017); Stacie B. 
Dusetzina et al., Out-of-Pocket and Health Care Spending Changes for Patients 
Using Orally Administered Anticancer Therapy After Adoption of State Parity 
Laws, J. AM. MED. ASS’N ONCOLOGY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://jamanetwork.com/ 
journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2661763. 
 6. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 7. 21st Century Cures, ENERGY & COM. SUBCOMMITTEE, https:// 
energycommerce.house.gov/cures (last visited June 18, 2018) (claiming that the 
21st Century Cures Act updates an outdated regulatory apparatus). 
 8. Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, S. 771, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (proposing reforms to all aspects of the innovation and access pro-
cess). 
 9. Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CRE-
ATES) Act of 2017, S. 974, 115th Cong. (proposing reforms to the process by 
which generic drug companies access samples to demonstrate bioequivalence). 
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aimed to fill the void, advancing eighty bills on the topic in thirty 
states in 2017 alone.10 
Yet too often, those who focus on the FDA and those who 
focus on reimbursement fail to appreciate the links between the 
two programs. At least in the United States, FDA approval and 
insurance reimbursement for prescription drugs are tightly 
linked by law, in a way that affects policy choices on both sides 
of the equation.11 It is critical that scholars and policymakers 
come to understand this linkage. Understanding the relation-
ship between approval and reimbursement is key to effective pol-
icymaking. Lawmakers must seek to ensure that policies are ac-
tually capable of having their intended effect, and that they do 
not also have significant unintended consequences. This Article 
considers the ways in which approval and reimbursement are 
linked in the United States and envisions a system in which the 
two are delinked, if only partially. 
Part I provides an overview of the legal relationship between 
FDA approval and insurance reimbursement. In the United 
States, federal law requires Medicare and Medicaid to cover 
most, and in many cases all, FDA-approved drugs.12 Private pay-
ers are typically subject to regulation as well, either through 
state-level coverage mandates for particular sets of drugs or 
through the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) essential health bene-
fits requirements for plans sold on the individual and small-
group markets.13 Part II explores the ways in which this legal 
linkage affects our policy choices. Existing proposals that would 
require the FDA to approve drugs on the basis of less (or less 
robust) evidence would statistically result in the approval of 
more unsafe, ineffective drugs14—and Medicare and Medicaid 
would need to pay for all of them. Reform of the FDA’s approval 
system without accompanying reform to insurance reimburse-
ment would be more likely to increase costs, rather than de-
crease them. Similarly, it is not productive as a policy matter to 
permit Medicare to negotiate the price of prescription drugs if 
the government cannot walk away from the deal a pharmaceuti-
cal company is offering. 
 
 10. AARON BERMAN ET AL., YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP, CURBING 
UNFAIR DRUG PRICES: A PRIMER FOR STATES 3 (2017), https://law.yale.edu/ 
system/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/curbing_unfair_drug_prices-policy_ 
paper-080717.pdf. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
 14. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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Part III envisions a thought experiment, considering what 
the potential policy impacts of strongly delinking approval and 
reimbursement might be. Specifically, what would be the impli-
cations for both innovation and access if payers like Medicare 
and Medicaid were not required to cover these products? There 
are at least three potential consequences, although their precise 
reach undoubtedly depends on the scope of revisions made to ex-
isting law. First, there would likely be some reduction in access 
to these medicines. If payers are not legally required to cover 
certain drugs, they will no longer choose to.  
Second, if pharmaceutical companies know that coverage is 
not automatic—that they must earn coverage, perhaps by 
demonstrating their product’s efficacy over competing drugs—
then they may innovate more thoughtfully, in ways that are so-
cially valuable. For instance, we may gain additional infor-
mation as a society about the comparative costs and benefits of 
different drugs in a particular class.  
Third, strong delinkage would help address the drug pricing 
problem, precisely because of both of the above considerations. A 
government which can credibly follow through on the threat not 
to cover a particular product can extract greater discounts in 
agreeing to cover it. 
Part IV examines three real-world delinkage models to eval-
uate the potential likelihood that each of these policy outcomes 
would be realized. In the United States, the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs (VA) is permitted to construct a formulary, unlike 
Medicare and Medicaid. This delinkage has resulted in lower 
drug spending, but it has also decreased access to medicines by 
some amount.15 The model deployed in many European coun-
tries has displayed similar results, with national payers or reg-
ulators negotiating on behalf of their citizens.16 However, in nei-
ther case have policymakers observed the development of 
relevant data about the comparative effectiveness of drugs in a 
given class. Another American delinkage model, our system of 
approving and covering medical devices,17 illustrates some of the 
policy concerns that might arise for drug companies if the two 
regulatory systems are delinked. 
Part V considers policy options short of full delinkage that 
might help achieve key benefits of delinkage while avoiding 
some of its most concerning impacts. Focusing on the theoretical 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. See infra Part IV.B. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C. 
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justifications for the structure of both the FDA approval system 
and public insurance system, Part V links theories of regulation 
and innovation with specific policy options. The traditional the-
ory of the FDA as a consumer protection agency might counsel 
in favor of a carefully designed partial delinkage approach like 
the one recently considered by the state of Massachusetts.18 The 
more modern theory that understands the FDA as an innova-
tion-focused, information-producing agency might encourage col-
laboration between the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) to accomplish mutual goals.19 In addi-
tion, more recent scholarship that has considered the role of 
CMS as an innovation agency in its own right reveals a range of 
solutions targeted at modernizing our reimbursement system.20 
I.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FDA APPROVAL AND 
INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT   
Although there is not always perfect agreement between the 
set of FDA-approved drugs and the drugs payers are required to 
cover, in general there is significant overlap. Particularly for 
public payers, this robust coverage of prescription drugs is re-
quired by federal law. Although private payers are often less con-
strained, many of them provide similarly comprehensive pre-
scription drug coverage pursuant to federal and state laws. This 
Part presents these various legal regimes and considers the 
ways in which they are expressed across a range of particularly 
relevant examples. 
A. PUBLIC PAYERS 
In the United States, CMS provides insurance to over 
100,000,000 Americans through Medicare and Medicaid.21 These 
two programs were enacted together, as part of the Social Secu-
rity Amendments of 1965,22 but the two differ along a range of 
 
 18. See infra Part V.A. 
 19. See infra Part V.B. 
 20. See infra Part V.C. 
 21. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRI-
ATIONS COMMITTEES 109 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency 
-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2016-CJ-Final.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES]. 
 22. Key Milestones in Medicare and Medicaid History, Selected Years: 1965–
2003, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 1 (2005), https://www.cms.gov/Research 
-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/ 
downloads/05-06Winpg1.pdf. 
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dimensions. A first key point of distinction is the division of gov-
erning responsibilities the programs create between the states 
and the federal government. Medicare is exclusively federally 
run and administered, while Medicaid is a classic cooperative-
federalism program,23 jointly administered between the federal 
government and the states.24 States are statutorily empowered 
to seek waivers to Medicaid’s general framework, allowing them 
to expand coverage to new populations25 or to experiment with 
new delivery systems.26 As such, although the broad strokes of 
the program remain consistent across states, every state’s pro-
gram differs in the details of its implementation.27 
The programs also differ in terms of the populations they 
cover. Medicare was designed to cover essentially all Americans 
beginning when they reach the age of sixty-five.28 By contrast, 
Medicaid was initially conceived of as providing health insur-
ance to the “deserving poor,”29 including children, pregnant 
 
 23. Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Consti-
tution of American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 224 (2012). 
 24. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: 
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE 
L.J. 534, 562, 577 (2011). 
 25. Id. at 563. 
 26. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-43, tit. I, § 122, 
tit. XI, § 1115, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (1962) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315 
(1988)) (providing for experimental project waivers). 
 27. Policy Basics: Introduction to Medicaid, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRI-
ORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/policy-basics-introduction-to 
-medicaid (last visited June 18, 2018) (“Because the federal guidelines are 
broad, states have a great deal of flexibility in designing and administering their 
programs. As a result, Medicaid eligibility and benefits can and often do vary 
widely from state to state.”).  
 28. For background on the original design and implementation of Medicare, 
see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 368–
70 (1982). 
 29. David Orentlicher, Medicaid at 50: No Longer Limited to the “Deserv-
ing” Poor?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 185, 185–86 (2015). See 
STARR, supra note 28, at 372–74 (describing the impetus for creating access to 
health care for the poor). 
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women, parents of minor children, the elderly,30 and disabled in-
dividuals.31 The ACA attempted to impose a mandatory Medi-
caid expansion that would have covered everyone below 138% of 
the poverty line,32 but the Supreme Court effectively held that 
the Medicaid expansion must be optional for states.33 At present, 
thirty-three states have opted into the expansion,34 meaning 
that in many states, nondisabled, childless adults still have little 
or no Medicaid coverage.35 
 
 30. Seniors whose income and assets are sufficiently low qualify for both 
Medicare and Medicaid. There are nearly ten million of these “dual eligibles.” 
KATHERINE YOUNG ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR DUAL 
ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 1 (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files 
.wordpress.com/2013/08/7846-04-medicaids-role-for-dual-eligible-beneficiaries 
.pdf. 
 31. Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67, 70 (2015). 
 32. See Affordable Care Act Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www 
.medicaid.gov/affordable-care-act/eligibility/index.html (last visited June 18, 
2018) (stating that the eligibility for Medicaid under the ACA is expanded to 
individuals with incomes up to 133% of the poverty line); Medicaid Expansion 
& What it Means for You, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
medicaid-chip/medicaid-expansion-and-you (last visited June 18, 2018) (point-
ing out that in most cases the calculation of income results in a 138% threshold).  
 33. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012). The 
Court held that although the Secretary of Health and Human Services could not 
constitutionally condition existing Medicaid funds on a state’s failure to expand 
Medicaid, she could offer additional funds to states choosing to expand Medi-
caid. Id.; see also Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 83, 108 (2012) (“[States] do not have an obligation to expand their Med-
icaid programs . . . .”). 
 34. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., http://www.kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid 
-expansion-decision (last updated Apr. 5, 2018). In the November 2017 elections, 
the citizens of Maine voted to expand Medicaid, but as of this writing, their 
recalcitrant governor has refused to do so. Abby Goodnough, Maine Voters Ap-
prove Medicaid Expansion, a Rebuke of Governor LePage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/us/maine-medicaid-healthcare 
.html; Kevin Miller, Groups Press LePage To File Medicaid Expansion Plan as 
Time Runs Out, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www 
.pressherald.com/2018/04/03/maine-hits-the-federal-deadline-for-medicaid 
-expansion-plan. 
 35. As with the original passage of the Medicaid statute, however, this pro-
cess is likely to take some time. The last state to join Medicaid the first time, 
Arizona, did so seventeen years after the law’s passage. Nicole Huberfeld, Fed-
eralizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 445 n.69 (2011). See generally 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF HOW STATES HAVE RE-
SPONDED TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE 2–
6 (Aug. 2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8349 
.pdf (describing the varying Medicaid implementation timelines for different 
states and examining the effect of federal funds on states’ decisions).  
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Within Medicare, prescription drugs are primarily covered 
under two different sections of the program: Part B and Part D. 
Medicare Part B primarily covers physician services in the out-
patient setting,36 but in doing so it also covers prescription drugs 
that are administered in doctors’ offices and outpatient set-
tings.37 These drugs—typically large biologics used for the treat-
ment of conditions like cancer,38 arthritis,39 or macular degener-
ation40—can cost thousands of dollars per dose, with many doses 
needed over the course of a year.41 Part B spending on drugs to-
taled nearly twenty-five billion dollars in 2015,42 and half or 
more of this total comes from anticancer drugs.43 
Part B coverage of prescription drugs is governed chiefly by 
the same standard that governs coverage of services under that 
program: whatever is “reasonable and necessary for the diagno-
sis or treatment of illness or injury.”44 However, “reasonable and 
 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2) (2012). 
 37. Id. § 1395u(o)(1). 
 38. In 2015, Part B spent $1.25 billion on pegfilgrastim, a drug used in con-
junction with chemotherapeutic agents to stimulate the production of white 
blood cells. Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/ 
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Dashboard/2015-Medicare-Drug-Spending/ 
medicare-drug-spending-dashboard-2015-data.html (last visited June 18, 
2018); Pegfilgrastim, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.cancer 
.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/pegfilgrastim. 
 39. In 2015, Part B spent $1.24 billion on infliximab, a drug used to treat 
rheumatoid arthritis and other autoimmune conditions. Infliximab (by Injec-
tion), NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/ 
PMHT0010708 (last visited June 18, 2018); Medicare Drug Spending Dash-
board 2015, supra note 38. 
 40. In 2015, Part B spent $1.8 billion on aflibercept, a drug used to treat 
age-related macular degeneration and other related conditions. Aflibercept In-
jection, NAT’L LIBR. MED.: MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/ 
meds/a612004.html (last updated Feb. 15, 2017); Medicare Drug Spending 
Dashboard 2015, supra note 38. 
 41. See, e.g., Tracy Staton, Eylea May Beat Lucentis on Price, but What of 
Avastin?, FIERCEPHARMA (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.fiercepharma.com/ 
pharma/eylea-may-beat-lucentis-on-price-but-what-of-avastin (describing per-
dose costs of $1850 to $2000 and yearly treatments ranging from $16,000 to 
$24,000). 
 42. The twenty-five billion dollar figure was calculated using data provided 
by CMS. Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38. 
 43. MEDPAC, supra note 4 (“In 2014, Medicare spending for anticancer 
drugs accounted for about 55 percent of the nearly $21 billion spent on Part B 
drugs . . . .”). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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necessary” is not defined by the statute or regulations,45 and as 
such CMS has set up extensive coverage-determination proce-
dures.46 In practice, Part B drug coverage is quite broad and is 
limited primarily by the structure of the program. That is, Part 
B coverage is restricted to drugs which are not self-administered 
and are provided in the course of a physician’s service.47 But Part 
B cannot decline to cover an effective FDA-approved drug simply 
because it is expensive,48 and the Part B payment system is even 
structured to encourage physicians to prescribe more expensive 
products.49 
Although the broader Medicare program has existed since 
1965, Medicare did not provide a standard pharmacy benefit 
plan to seniors until 2003,50 when Medicare Part D was cre-
ated.51 Total expenditures on drugs under the Part D program 
are much higher than under Part B, with 2015 spending under 
the program exceeding $135 billion.52 The drugs with the highest 
expenditures under the Part D program tell a slightly different 
story than the drugs with the highest expenditures under Part 
B. To be sure, the expensive multiple-myeloma drug Revlimid 
cost Part D just over two billion dollars in 2015, for the treatment 
 
 45. See Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Pro-
viders to the Payers of Medicare, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1068–69 (2016); Peter 
J. Neumann & James D. Chambers, Medicare’s Enduring Struggle to Define 
“Reasonable and Necessary” Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1775, 1775–76 (2012). 
 46. See Medicare Coverage Determination Process, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/Determination 
Process/index.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2018). See generally Eleanor D. Kin-
ney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can Process 
Meet the Challenge of New Medical Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 
1471–89 (2003) (describing Part B coverage determination and appeals pro-
cesses). 
 47. MEDPAC, supra note 4, at 121. 
 48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A). 
 49. MEDPAC, supra note 4, at 118, 127. See infra text accompanying notes 
244–48 for a fuller explanation of this point. 
 50. See JANET LUNDY, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
TRENDS 5 (2010) (“[A]bout one-quarter (27%) of seniors age 65 and older, and 
one-third of poor (34%) and near-poor (33%) seniors, had no drug coverage in 
2003 [when Congress passed Part D].”); see also Dana Gelb Safran et al., Pre-
scription Drug Coverage and Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National Survey, 
HEALTH AFF. (Web Exclusive) (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 51. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 21, 
26, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 52. Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38 (using the 
Part D spreadsheet to calculate). 
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of roughly 30,000 beneficiaries.53 But the program also spent 
nearly $2.9 billion providing Crestor, a high cholesterol drug, to 
more than 1.7 million beneficiaries, at a much lower cost per pa-
tient.54 
Part D’s coverage requirements are specified quite clearly in 
both statute and regulation. By law, plans must cover at least 
two FDA-approved55 drugs per therapeutic class,56 although 
plans generally cover more than two.57 And for six classes of 
drugs—anticonvulsants, antidepressants, antineoplastics (can-
cer drugs), antipsychotics, antiretrovirals (for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS), and immunosuppressants (for the treatment of 
transplant rejection) Medicare must cover essentially all FDA-
approved drugs.58 There are two primary reasons for the protec-
tion of these six classes. First, CMS wanted to prevent discrimi-
nation against beneficiaries with these conditions, as might be 
expected for patients with high-cost preexisting conditions.59 
Second, CMS aimed to “mitigate the risks and complications as-
sociated with an interruption of therapy for these vulnerable 
populations.”60 
Medicaid’s system of prescription drug coverage is some-
what simpler. The federal government does not require that 
state Medicaid programs cover outpatient prescription drugs, 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2017) defines “Part D drug” for the purposes of the 
program by reference to Social Security Act section 1927(k)(2)(A), the Medicaid 
statute, which is linked to drugs approved under the FDA statute. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(i) (2012) (referencing section 505(c) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2012)). 
 56. 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2)(i).  
 57. NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, MEDICARE PART D DRUG PLANS: WHAT THEY 
MUST, MAY, AND CANNOT COVER 1 (2017), https://www.ncoa.org/resources/ 
medicare-part-d-plans-what-they-must-can-cannot-cover. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(iv). 
 59. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S.DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL ch. 16, 
§ 30.2.5 (2016) [hereinafter MEDICARE MANUAL], https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/ 
Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf; see also Douglas B. Jacobs 
& Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Drugs to Discriminate—Adverse Selection in 
the Insurance Marketplace, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 400 (2015) (describing 
how some insurers structure prescription drug benefits to deter high-cost pa-
tients from enrolling in their plans). 
 60. MEDICARE MANUAL, supra note 59. 
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but all states have chosen to do so.61 That choice comes with a 
set of coverage obligations. States must cover all FDA-approved 
drugs with a few classes of exceptions,62 such as drugs used for 
cosmetic purposes.63 To be sure, Medicaid programs are permit-
ted to use formulary management tools like prior authorization 
or step therapy to steer patients toward less-expensive products, 
at least at first.64 But where these tools are used in a way that 
goes beyond treatment guidelines, patients have sued and ob-
tained access to rationed products.65 
Medicaid’s coverage requirements come with preferred-pric-
ing benefits for the states. By law, pharmaceutical companies 
must remit to Medicaid a rebate for each unit of a drug they sell 
to the program, and these rebates can be quite substantial. In-
novator drug companies must remit at least 23.1% of a drug’s 
Average Manufacturer Price (AMP),66 and states are empowered 
to seek additional rebates on top of that.67 If the company offers 
an even bigger discount to another payer, Medicaid is entitled by 
law to that “best price” provided to another entity for the drug.68 
Medicaid is also insulated from price increases in existing drugs 
that outpace the inflation rate,69 and more than half of Medicaid 
rebates are estimated to be due to this provision.70 
 
 61. JULIA PARADISE, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID MOVING FOR-
WARD 4 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/medicaid 
-moving-forward. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2). 
 63. See id. § 1396r-8(d)(2)(C); see also id. § 1396r-8(d)(2). 
 64. Id. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A), (d)(4). 
 65. E.g., Ed Silverman, Washington State Told To Lift Restrictions on Hep-
atitis C Medicines, STAT (May 27, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/ 
2016/05/27/washington-state-hepatitis-drug-prices; Joseph Walker, Arkansas 
Reaches Settlement in Cystic Fibrosis Drug Suit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/arkansas-reaches-settlement-in-cystic-fibrosis 
-drug-suit-1423162197.  
 66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B)(i)(VI); see also Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2503(a)(2), 124 Stat. 310 (2010) (cod-
ified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(1)(A)) (redefining AMP). 
 67. Generic companies must remit thirteen percent of the AMP per unit. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(3)(B)(iii). 
 68. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I). There are some exceptions to this. Prices 
paid by Medicare Part D plans or the Veterans Administration, for instance, are 
excluded. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(i). 
 69. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(2)(A). 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
OEI-03-13-00650, MEDICAID REBATES FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS EXCEEDED 
PART D REBATES BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN 8 (2015). 
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Importantly, Medicaid coverage seems to be required re-
gardless of the FDA pathway the drug in question takes to ap-
proval. Before 1992, drugs approved by the FDA took a fairly 
standard path to approval, proceeding through three phases of 
clinical trials designed to demonstrate safety and efficacy.71 Alt-
hough many innovators still make use of this traditional path-
way today, more and more innovator companies are taking ad-
vantage of a set of expedited development programs to speed 
their path to market.72 
Some of these programs offer primarily procedural benefits. 
For example, the Fast Track and Breakthrough Therapy Desig-
nations give qualifying sponsors more opportunities to meet and 
work with FDA officials in ways that ensure trials are designed 
efficiently and carefully from the beginning.73 However, the Ac-
celerated Approval program is more substantive. It permits 
sponsors to obtain FDA approval on the basis of a surrogate end-
point or an intermediate clinical endpoint that is reasonably 
likely to predict the drug’s clinical benefit.74 This program is in-
tended to address unmet medical needs “for a serious or life-
threatening disease or condition.”75 In theory, drugs approved 
under this program are subject to required postapproval clinical 
trials, to confirm and support their effectiveness.76 However, too 
often these trials are not completed.77 
Drugs approved under the Accelerated Approval program 
are not subject to the same standards before FDA approval as 
 
 71. PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 628 (3d ed. 2007). 
 72. Martin Kwok et al., Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions: An Up-
date on Breakthrough Therapy Designation, 37 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2104, 
2104 (2015). 
 73. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)–(b) (2012); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUS-
TRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS—DRUGS AND BIOLOG-
ICS 7–8 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ 
UCM358301.pdf (comparing FDA programs for expediting drug approval). 
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 151–55 for a more in-depth discus-
sion of surrogate endpoints. 
 75. 21 U.S.C. § 356(c)(1)(A). 
 76. Huseyin Naci et al., Characteristics of Preapproval and Postapproval 
Studies for Drugs Granted Accelerated Approval by the US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 626, 627 (2017). 
 77. Id. at 634 (noting that of twenty-four indications approved under the 
Accelerated Approval program, five years after approval eight indications still 
had not fulfilled their postmarket requirements). 
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drugs subjected to the standard three-phase clinical trial pro-
cess.78 As such, there may be a question about whether Medicaid 
should be legally required to cover them, if coverage is viewed as 
a reward for successful completion of the thorough FDA review 
process. The FDA has taken the position that “because drugs ap-
proved under the accelerated approval process meet the statu-
tory standards for safety and effectiveness, they would be eligi-
ble for reimbursement under State Medicaid programs or other 
third-party plans.”79 It is not clear why this would be the FDA’s 
interpretive decision to make (rather than CMS’s decision), but 
to date, it does not appear that CMS has formally advanced a 
contrary position.80 
B. PRIVATE PAYERS 
The statutes and regulations governing coverage through 
private payers are more complex. Private insurance is also reg-
ulated at the state level, and there are often state-level coverage 
mandates for particular conditions. For instance, forty-two 
states require payers to cover all FDA-approved cancer thera-
pies.81 Forty-six states have laws mandating diabetes coverage, 
including at least a subset of relevant medications.82 
Private plans that are marketed under the ACA are jointly 
regulated at the federal and state level.83 Federal regulations re-
quire plans sold in the individual and small-group insurance 
markets to cover ten essential health benefits, one of which is 
 
 78. New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, Accel-
erated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601). 
 79. Id. at 58,945. 
 80. A 2015 presentation from the Executive Director of the National Asso-
ciation of Medicaid Directors seemed to confirm this view, noting that Medicaid 
currently “requires coverage regardless of approval pathway.” Matt Salo, High-
Cost Drugs: Impacts on the Medicaid Program at slide 7 (Apr. 9, 2015), http:// 
www.csrxp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CSRxP-Congressional-briefing8 
.pdf. 
 81. Lee N. Newcomer, Those Who Pay Have a Say: A View on Oncology Drug 
Pricing and Reimbursement, 21 ONCOLOGIST 779, 779 (2016). 
 82. Although the states differed as to how many medication options they 
provided to patients, they all offered coverage of at least a dozen brand-name 
drugs. Diabetes Pharmaceuticals State Mandates, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG-
ISLATURES (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/diabetes 
-pharmaceuticals-state-mandates.aspx. 
 83. See David Blumenthal & Sara R. Collins, Health Care Coverage Under 
the Affordable Care Act—A Progress Report, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 275, 281 
(2014). 
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prescription drug coverage.84 At a minimum, these plans must 
cover at least one drug per therapeutic class.85 But, at present, 
the federal government has delegated the choice of a minimum 
benchmark plan to each state,86 and these benchmark plans of-
ten require more expansive coverage.87 
To the extent that private plans are legally required to cover 
fewer drugs than Medicare or Medicaid are, they may have more 
freedom to negotiate prices than do public payers. However, pri-
vate payers’ ability to demand those discounts may be practically 
limited. Medicaid’s statutory best-price rule requires that phar-
maceutical companies providing large discounts to private pay-
ers extend those discounts to Medicaid as well.88 For drugs 
whose indications have a relatively high prevalence among the 
Medicaid population, it is easy to imagine their manufacturers 
limiting discounts to private payers to prevent triggering the 
best-price rule. 
Importantly, just because a payer is legally required to cover 
a particular product does not mean it will be affordable to the 
patient in question. Medicare and private payers often impose 
significant out-of-pocket cost sharing, although Medicaid copay-
ments are tightly regulated by the government.89 Medicare Part 
D enrollees may need to pay thousands of dollars out of pocket, 
particularly for expensive specialty drugs.90 And for the growing 
proportion of privately ensured patients who are enrolled in a 
 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(F) (2012). 
 85. 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(1)(i) (2017). 
 86. See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Af-
fordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1716–17 (2016). 
 87. See Joshua P. Cohen et al., Complying With State and Federal Regula-
tions on Essential Drug Benefits: Implementing the Affordable Care Act, 20 AM. 
J. MANAGED CARE 153 (2014) (explaining how HHS implies broader coverage of 
prescription drugs, as it would require state coverage of either at least one drug 
in each therapeutic class, or the number of drugs that the benchmark plan of-
fers, whichever is more); State Insurance Mandates and the ACA Essential Ben-
efits Provisions, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 12, 2018), http:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-ins-mandates-and-aca-essential-benefits 
.aspx#EHB_Rx (“The benefits and services included in the benchmark health 
insurance plan selected by the state would be the essential health benefits pack-
age. Plans could modify coverage within a benefit category so long as they do 
not reduce the value of coverage.”). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C). 
 89. Cost Sharing Out of Pocket Costs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/cost-sharing/out-of-pocket 
-costs/index.html (describing out-of-pocket costs imposed by states under Medi-
caid). 
 90. See supra note 5. 
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high-deductible health plan,91 they may similarly be exposed to 
thousands of dollars in cost sharing before their insurance cov-
erage kicks in.92 These up-front costs may dissuade or prevent 
patients from accessing even covered products.93 
II.  LINKAGE AFFECTS POLICY CHOICES ABOUT BOTH 
APPROVAL AND COVERAGE   
The legal link between FDA approval and insurance reim-
bursement has implications for policy proposals in both areas. 
This Part considers policy initiatives that scholars and policy-
makers have proposed on both sides of the issue and explains 
how those initiatives would be affected by the legal relationship 
between approval and reimbursement. In short, initiatives that 
would alter the FDA’s approval process would likely have signif-
icant unintended consequences. And initiatives that would seek 
to affect drug pricing and overall drug spending would be ren-
dered toothless. 
A. ALTERING THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS 
Over the last several years, academics and policymakers 
have proposed a number of initiatives that would permit or re-
quire the FDA to approve drugs on the basis of less (or less ro-
bust) evidence. Some of these proposals are quite extreme, such 
as proposals to approve drugs on the basis of safety data alone, 
rather than requiring proof of efficacy.94 Others are much more 
 
 91. See 2015 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2015-summary-of 
-findings (noting that in 2015, twenty-four percent of workers were enrolled in 
a high-deductible plan, up from four percent in 2006). 
 92. See 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey: High-Deductible Plans With 
Savings Option, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.kff.org/ 
report-section/ehbs-2016-section-eight-high-deductible-health-plans-with 
-savings-option. 
 93. See, e.g., ROBIN A. COHEN & MARIA A. VILLARROEL, STRATEGIES USED 
BY ADULTS TO REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS: UNITED STATES, 
2013, NCHS DATA BRIEF 2 (Jan. 2015) (detailing strategies patients used to re-
duce prescription drug costs, including skipping doses or delaying filling a pre-
scription). Professor Amy Monahan has looked closely at the ways in which ACA 
plans have implemented the Act’s essential health benefit requirements, includ-
ing for prescription drugs like those for the treatment of hepatitis C, in ways 
that impose significant out-of-pocket costs on patients. See generally Amy B. 
Monahan, Undermining the ACA: How the Regulatory Failure to Define Essen-
tial Health Benefits Allows Strategic Insurer Behavior, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 94. See, e.g., Joseph V. Gulfo, A Trumpian Cure for the FDA’s Chronic Leth-
argy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-trumpian 
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moderate, such as the provision in the 21st Century Cures Act 
requiring the FDA to consider the potential use of “real-world 
evidence,” rather than randomized, controlled trials, in the ap-
proval of secondary indications for existing drugs.95 Still others 
lie in between, such as the proposed Reciprocity Ensures 
Streamlined Use of Lifesaving Treatments (RESULT) Act, which 
would require the FDA to speed review of drugs that are already 
approved for marketing in a particular list of foreign countries.96 
Proponents of these and other initiatives argue that many 
of the requirements the FDA imposes on manufacturers seeking 
to bring new drugs to market are mere bureaucratic “red tape.”97 
In their view, if we could only tear down the barriers the FDA 
imposes throughout the regulatory process, there would be enor-
mous benefits to the system. Drug approvals would happen 
much more quickly,98 Americans would be able to access life-sav-
ing drugs and devices which are already available elsewhere,99 
 
-cure-for-the-fdas-chronic-lethargy-1479773883 (suggesting returning the FDA 
to its original role of ensuring that approved drugs have demonstrated biological 
activity in fighting a disease and can be labeled for safe use); Ed Silverman, 
Trump Is Considering a Radical To Lead FDA, STAT (Dec. 12, 2016), https:// 
www.statnews.com/2016/12/12/donald-trump-fda-oneill (describing Jim 
O’Neill’s views on approval of prescription drugs). Importantly, at some level 
this proposal is incoherent. Safety cannot be assessed independently of efficacy. 
The FDA review process assesses the safety of drugs only in comparison to their 
efficacy for a particular indication. A safety profile that may be acceptable in 
the context of a drug that is effective at treating late-stage cancer may be en-
tirely unacceptable for a vaccine administered to an otherwise healthy individ-
ual. If a drug turns out to have high efficacy, more safety concerns might be 
tolerated. 
 95. See 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 34, 114th Cong. § 3022 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 355g (2012)). The impact of this provision remains to be seen, as the 
FDA Commissioner has not yet established a draft framework for considering 
such evidence, as required by the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 355g(c)(1). 
 96. See RESULT Act, S. 2022, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Erika Lietzan, 
Thoughts on “Reciprocal Marketing Approval,” OBJECTIVE INTENT (Nov. 3, 
2017), https://objectiveintent.blog/2017/11/03/thoughts-on-reciprocal 
-marketing-approval (describing why she calls the RESULT Act the “Send All 
of the FDA Employees Home Act of 2017”). 
 97. Press Release, Senator Ted Cruz Press Office, Cruz, Lee Introduce the 
RESULT Act (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_ 
release&id=2554; Gulfo, supra note 94. 
 98. Gulfo, supra note 94. 
 99. Senator Ted Cruz Press Office, supra note 97. 
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and drug prices might even go down.100 The veracity of these pre-
dictions aside,101 this Section focuses on another effect of these 
initiatives and others like them. 
These initiatives would lead the FDA to approve more un-
safe, ineffective drugs. Importantly, this is not meant pejora-
tively. It is meant as a statistical observation about the kind of 
question the FDA must answer when it approves a drug. The 
FDA must consider how to balance Type I and Type II errors in 
the approval process. As a matter of policy, one option would be 
for the FDA to focus on minimizing the number of unsafe or in-
effective drugs that it approves (minimizing Type I errors). On 
this view, the FDA should not put its stamp of approval on drugs 
that harm patients or that do not work.102 Over time, too many 
approvals of unsafe or ineffective drugs could erode public trust 
in the FDA as a tool for consumer protection.103 More generally, 
this is the entire reason the FDA possesses the legal authority 
to screen pharmaceuticals for safety and efficacy. Scandals in-
volving unsafe or ineffective drugs prompted Congress to give 
the FDA more and greater powers over the years, in large part 
to prevent such products coming to market in the first in-
stance.104 
Alternatively, a second option would be for the FDA to focus 
on minimizing the number of safe, effective drugs it fails to ap-
prove (minimizing Type II errors).105 On this view, it is worse for 
 
 100. Gulfo, supra note 94. 
 101. The FDA already approves most drugs more quickly than its developed 
world counterparts (Europe, Canada, and Japan), so the set of drugs to which 
this applies is small. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Downing et al., Regulatory Review of 
Novel Therapeutics—Comparison of Three Regulatory Agencies, 366 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2284, 2284 (2012); Matthieu Larochelle et al., Assessing the Potential 
Clinical Impact of Reciprocal Drug Approval Legislation on Access to Novel 
Therapeutics in the USA: A Cohort Study, 7 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2017). 
 102. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER 1–32 (2010) (describ-
ing the role of the FDA as gatekeeper). 
 103. Id. at 11. 
 104. Id. at 73, 228 (detailing the elixir sulfanilamide and thalidomide trage-
dies and their contribution to the enactment of legislation giving the FDA new 
powers). 
 105. Importantly, this is not truly an either or issue. It is consistent to re-
quire vaccines or other preventive interventions to undergo strict testing, as 
they are administered to healthy people, and at the same time speed drugs to 
market for deadly conditions where patients have no other treatment options. 
As discussed in Part I, supra text accompanying notes 73–80, there are already 
accelerated-approval systems in place to help accomplish this latter goal today, 
systems which may account for a larger percentage of the unsafe, ineffective 
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the FDA to deny patients access to a drug that is safe and effec-
tive than it is for the FDA to approve a drug that later is shown 
to be unsafe or ineffective. This view might still permit the FDA 
to screen out drugs with significant safety signals or reject drugs 
with no plausible mechanism of action, and this view might re-
quire postmarket surveillance studies. However, in general, this 
view holds that the FDA ought to be enabling sick patients to 
access drugs more quickly. This view of the FDA’s role places 
greater responsibility on insurers, physicians, and patients to 
gather, process, and act on information about a drug’s safety and 
efficacy. 
Over the last few decades, the FDA has generally chosen to 
err on the side of minimizing the number of unsafe, ineffective 
drugs it approves (minimizing Type I errors).106 Importantly, un-
der this view the right number of approved unsafe, ineffective 
drugs is still not zero. The FDA certainly makes mistakes, and 
so although the “right” number in our current system is some-
thing small, it is not zero. These policy proposals envision a sys-
tem in which the FDA approves many more drugs, the efficacy 
of which has not yet been tested in the real world or has been 
tested on a limited basis. They thus envision a system in which 
the right number of approved unsafe, ineffective drugs is much 
higher than it is right now, and certainly far higher than zero. 
This position is entirely defensible. Proponents might argue 
that Type II errors are more visible and therefore fixable, as ap-
proved drugs can be studied further to examine potential safety 
signals, while unapproved drugs cannot be studied as easily.107 
When expressed publicly, however, defenders usually do not con-
sider the full consequences the policy would create, precisely be-
cause of the link between FDA approval and insurance reim-
bursement. Insurers cannot easily sort out the efficacy of these 
unproven drugs and they will have no ability to demand addi-
tional information from manufacturers because they cannot de-
cline to cover the drugs, even though their efficacy has not been 
demonstrated. 
 
drugs approved at present. See Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Break-
through-Drug Category—Implications for Patients, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1252, 
1253–54 (2014). 
 106. See Montazerhodjat & Lo, supra note 2, at 3. (“[T]he current standards 
of drug-approval are weighted more on avoiding a Type I error (approving inef-
fective therapies) rather than a Type II error (rejecting effective therapies).”). 
 107. It is possible that drugs erroneously denied approval by the FDA apply-
ing strict safety and efficacy standards might be approved in other countries, 
providing opportunities for such study. 
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As a result, not only would these proposals lead to the ap-
proval of more unsafe, ineffective drugs—but Medicare and Med-
icaid would be required by law to cover nearly all of them. The 
idea that these proposals will somehow decrease drug spending 
is, therefore, difficult to understand. Reform of the FDA approval 
system without accompanying reform to insurance reimburse-
ment would likely increase spending, not decrease it.108 
B. CURBING DRUG PRICES AND SPENDING THROUGH MEDICARE 
AND MEDICAID 
Similarly, policy proposals aiming to control drug prices and 
spending through government-run insurance programs overlook 
the linked nature of approval and reimbursement and would 
therefore not have the desired policy impact. On the Medicare 
side, the idea that permitting Medicare to negotiate drug prices 
will significantly reduce costs has captivated policymakers on 
both sides of the aisle.109 And within the Medicaid program, 
some policymakers have contended that per-capita caps or other 
efforts to limit Medicaid spending will enable states to save on 
drug spending.110 Neither of these arguments standing alone is 
accurate. 
Policy arguments about permitting Medicare to negotiate 
for lower drug prices have their origin in a provision of the law 
establishing the Medicare Part D program that prohibits such 
conduct. Often referred to as the noninterference clause, the 
statute provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) “may not interfere with the negotiations between 
drug manufacturers and pharmacies and [Prescription Drug 
Plan] sponsors” and “may not require a particular formulary or 
institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part 
 
 108. This is somewhat of a perverse result, as those proposing such initia-
tives (like Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Mike Lee (R-UT), sponsors of the RE-
SULT Act) typically favor less federal spending on health care, rather than 
more. 
 109. See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Searching for Savings in Med-
icare Drug Price Negotiations, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 2017), http:// 
files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-searching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug 
-price-negotiations (“In response to higher drug spending growth and height-
ened attention to drug prices, some policymakers have proposed allowing Med-
icare to negotiate the price of prescription drugs—a proposal supported by 82 
percent of the public, including a majority of Democrats (93%), Republicans 
(68%), and Independents (85%).”). 
 110. See, e.g., Salvador Rizzo, MacArthur Faces the Wrath of New Jersey, 
OBSERVER (May 11, 2017), http://observer.com/2017/05/macarthur-faces-the 
-wrath-of-new-jersey. 
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D drugs.”111 Essentially, this section prohibits HHS from negoti-
ating or setting prices in Medicare Part D.112 The policy argu-
ment is therefore simple: if we permitted Medicare to negotiate 
on behalf of its fifty million enrollees,113 it would be able to ne-
gotiate deeper discounts than the program is currently able to 
demand. President Obama continually proposed to repeal the 
noninterference clause at least in part in his proposed budg-
ets,114 and President Trump has suggested he would like to im-
plement this policy as well.115 
However, these arguments either do not appreciate or will-
fully ignore the Medicare coverage requirements set out in Part 
I—requirements which severely limit the program’s bargaining 
power. Medicare might be able to achieve some savings where 
there is already market competition and where Medicare is per-
mitted to cover two drugs in that class, although it is difficult to 
see why private plans have not negotiated such deals already. 
But for the six protected classes in which Medicare must cover 
all products, or for expensive new drugs with few, if any, substi-
tutes, Medicare cannot walk away from the table if it does not 
like the deal companies are offering. This is why the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that providing Medicare 
with negotiating authority by itself “would have a negligible ef-
fect on Medicare drug spending.”116 
Importantly, negotiation authority could be coupled with 
other powers that would have such an impact. The CBO suggests 
that the “authority to establish a formulary”117 is one such 
power. In other words, if Medicare was permitted to decline to 
 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2012). 
 112. Importantly, this section does not apply to private entities who design 
and administer Part D plans. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COMPETITION AND THE 
COST OF MEDICARE’S PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAM 25 (2014). They do negoti-
ate prices, although their patient populations may be small relative to the pool 
of Medicare enrollees more generally. The idea is that Medicare, negotiating on 
behalf of all of its enrollees, would be able to leverage more bargaining power. 
 113. Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries (2015), KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries (last 
visited June 18, 2018). 
 114. Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 109. 
 115. See Alison Kodjak, Medicare Should Leverage Buying Power to Pull 
Down Drug Prices, White House Says, NPR (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.npr 
.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/07/513945538/white-house-says-medicare 
-should-leverage-its-buying-power-to-pull-down-drug-pri. 
 116. Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Ron Wy-
den, Senator 2 (Apr. 10, 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/79xx/doc7992/drugpricenegotiation.pdf. 
 117. Id. 
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cover a product when a pharmaceutical company refuses to deal 
fairly with Medicare in negotiations, it might be able to achieve 
savings.118 Of course, this would mean delinking FDA approval 
and insurance reimbursement, potentially depriving at least 
some patients of access to drugs that would otherwise have been 
available to them. 
A similar argument has been made in the context of the 
Medicaid program. Since its creation, Medicaid has been struc-
tured as an open-ended entitlement program. If states enroll 
more people in the program or provide them with more benefits 
in a particular year, the federal government will continue to pay 
for its share of the program. Particularly during economic down-
turns, when more individuals may lose their jobs and become el-
igible for Medicaid, the program expands to meet their needs.119 
More recently, a number of Republican legislators have pro-
posed funding Medicaid through finite block grants or per-capita 
caps, which would provide the states each year with either a 
fixed pot of money or a pot of money that is fixed on a per-enrol-
lee basis.120 The buzzword here is flexibility.121 The thinking is 
that states faced more explicitly with finite resources will make 
more efficient choices about how to allocate their funding, per-
haps cutting wasteful services or cutting rates on particular 
 
 118. This is not the only way to achieve such savings. The CBO also suggests 
that prices may simply be set administratively. Id. Scholars have suggested us-
ing binding arbitration as another option. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank & Joseph 
P. Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be Negotiated Under Part D of Medicare? And 
If So, How?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 33, 39–41 (2008) (discussing possible methods for 
setting drug prices, including arbitration). 
 119. David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal 
Volatility Problem, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 760 (2010) (“[M]ore state residents gen-
erally qualify for Medicaid during downturns . . . .”); Benjamin D. Sommers & 
Arnold M. Epstein, Why States Are So Miffed About Medicaid—Economics, Pol-
itics, and the “Woodwork Effect,” 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 100, 100 (2011). 
 120. See, e.g., American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th 
Cong. § 121; Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA) of 2017, Senate Amend-
ment to H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 133. 
 121. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, Burgess Defends GOP Health Care Bill, CNN 
(May 4, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/politics/michael-burgess-health 
-care-bill-cnntv/index.html (quoting Representative Burgess saying state gover-
nors have asked Congress for flexibility); Bruce Westerman, Medicaid Block 
Grants Give States More Freedom, THE HILL (Mar. 21, 2017), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/325097-medicaid-block-grants-give-states 
-more-freedom. 
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products or services.122 Legislators have suggested that such 
caps would permit states to achieve savings on drug costs.123 
It is difficult to see why this would be so. If Medicaid is re-
quired by law to cover essentially all FDA-approved drugs, it 
lacks the bargaining power to demand better prices on particular 
products. Perhaps some states would increase their use of step 
therapy or prior-authorization tactics and achieve some savings. 
But as states have been employing these efforts for decades, it is 
difficult to imagine they could achieve more than a marginal ad-
ditional level of savings through these techniques.124 Where pro-
posed caps would cut Medicaid funding levels by twenty-five per-
cent or more over the next decade,125 no program can absorb such 
cuts through incremental gains. 
Since prescription drugs are an optional category of cover-
age for Medicaid, states could decline to cover them entirely,126 
although that would be an extreme solution. More likely, states 
would pressure Congress to permit them to set formularies in 
Medicaid, using partial delinkage to create bargaining power, 
but also limiting access to such drugs.127 
The link between FDA approval and insurance reimburse-
ment is also the reason a number of state-level ballot initiatives 
attempting to control drug costs would be ineffective. California 
and Ohio have considered (and ultimately rejected) ballot initia-
tives that propose to cap what drug manufacturers can charge to 
public payers in the state (including Medicaid) at the price paid 
 
 122. Aaron E. Carroll, How Would Republican Plans for Medicaid Block 
Grants Actually Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/02/06/upshot/how-would-republican-plans-for-medicaid-block-grants 
-actually-work.html.  
 123. Rizzo, supra note 110 (quoting Representative Tom MacArthur that Re-
publican proposals would help drive down drug prices). 
 124. But see David Dranove et al., A Dose of Managed Care: Controlling Drug 
Spending in Medicaid 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
23956, 2017) (finding privatization of state Medicaid drug programs greatly re-
duced costs). 
 125. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LONGER-TERM EFFECTS OF THE BETTER CARE 
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2017 ON MEDICAID SPENDING 1 (2017) (concluding that 
BCRA would lower Medicaid spending by twenty-six percent in 2026, a number 
which would increase to thirty-five percent by 2036). 
 126. See Peter R. Orszag, One Nightmare Scenario in Senate Bill: Drug Ra-
tioning, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 28, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/ 
articles/2017-06-28/one-nightmare-scenario-in-senate-bill-drug-rationing (dis-
cussing how states may need to ration drug access to control costs). 
 127. Id. 
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by the VA.128 But the VA is permitted to establish drug formu-
laries and decline to cover drugs that are too expensive.129 State 
Medicaid programs are legally obligated to cover the relevant 
products and so do not clearly have the bargaining power to de-
mand that they pay the same prices as the VA. The VA can get 
up and walk away from the table—Medicaid cannot.130 
III.  HYPOTHESIZING DELINKAGE   
If academics and policymakers would like to implement pol-
icy changes of the type described in Part II but are unable to do 
so because of the link between these policy proposals and re-
quired drug coverage,131 one possibility is to delink the pro-
grams. It is important to consider both the positive and negative 
potential implications if approval and reimbursement were de-
linked. This Part considers three main policy consequences that 
might be expected to result from delinkage, although their pre-
cise reach undoubtedly depends on the scope of revisions made 
to existing law and the relative sizes of the markets at issue. 
A. REDUCING ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
The first and potentially most important consequence that 
might result from delinkage is a reduction in access to certain 
medicines. The concern is that if insurers (especially Medicare 
and Medicaid) are no longer legally required to cover certain 
drugs, they will no longer choose to. Whether this result is of real 
social concern depends on how valuable these excluded drugs are 
 
 128. Renee Hickman, Ohio Takes Drug Price Measure to Voting Booth, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 19, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ohio-takes-drug 
-n73014461943. 
 129. Austin B. Frakt et al., Should Medicare Adopt the Veterans Health Ad-
ministration Formulary?, 21 HEALTH ECON. 485, 487 (2012). 
 130. There is also a first-order barrier to the implementation of these initia-
tives. Capping state prices at VA prices seems to require the state to know what 
the VA is paying for a drug. However, the prices paid by the VA are generally 
not public. See Mike McCaughan et al., Health Policy Brief: Veterans Health 
Administration, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs 
.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000174/full. Nothing in either state initiative re-
quires pharmaceutical companies to disclose these prices to the relevant state 
actors, and it is not clear that the states would have the ability to access the 
information otherwise.  
 131. The sense in which policymakers would be unable to implement these 
changes is different for the two sets of reforms. In the case of policymakers who 
seek to speed the FDA approval process, they may or may not seek to limit pub-
lic spending on these newly approved drugs. In the case of policymakers who 
seek to enable Medicare to use more market-based tools to control prices, those 
initiatives will not be possible without delinkage. 
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to individual patients. Although it is difficult to specify with cer-
tainty what insurers might do in such a case, we can glean some 
potential concerning outcomes from existing insurer efforts to 
exclude drugs from coverage. 
First, expensive orphan drugs are likely to be a target for 
exclusion, even where only a small number of patients rely on 
them.132 Consider the case of Kalydeco, a drug approved for the 
treatment of cystic fibrosis in a subset of patients with a partic-
ular genetic mutation.133 Kalydeco may significantly improve 
the disease’s symptoms in that small group of patients, but its 
list price is over $300,000 per patient per year134—for a drug that 
patients may take for their entire lives. Although Medicaid pro-
grams are entitled to significant discounts off of this list price,135 
it is easy to see how state budgets can be strained by a few pa-
tients needing expensive drugs like this one. 
After Kalydeco’s approval, many state Medicaid programs 
aimed to limit the patients who could obtain the drug beyond the 
genetic limitations already imposed by the FDA. For instance, 
the programs required patients to demonstrate first that they 
had failed to respond to older, less expensive therapies. Patients 
objected, and three patients even sued Arkansas for denying 
them access to Kalydeco.136 The parties settled the case, with 
Arkansas changing its eligibility criteria for Kalydeco.137 But we 
 
 132. As defined by the Orphan Drug Act, these are drugs approved for the 
treatment of a disease or condition which “affects less than 200,000 persons in 
the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012). 
 133. FDA, PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: KALYDECO 2 (Feb. 2017), https:// 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/203188s022l_ 
207925s003lbl.pdf (listing the mutations patients may have for which Kalydeco 
is approved). 
 134. See Matthew Herper, For Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Can One Billion-Dol-
lar Breakthrough Beget Another?, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/08/08/vertex-pharmaceuticals-and-the-price-of 
-inspiration. 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2012) (setting the “minimum rebate 
percentage” for rebate periods after December 31, 2009 at 23.1%). 
 136. Arkansas has said that “[c]ost alone was not the determining factor” in 
imposing these restrictions on Kalydeco. But internal state emails showed that 
state officials expressed concern about the cost. See Joseph Walker, Costly Ver-
tex Drug Is Denied, and Medicaid Patients Sue, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/costly-drug-vertex-is-denied-and-medicaid 
-patients-sue-1405564205. 
 137. Arkansas had actually changed its eligibility criteria for Kalydeco after 
the initiation of the lawsuit but before the settlement occurred, and they tech-
nically agreed to maintain those new eligibility criteria. Walker, supra note 65. 
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might expect states to exclude these drugs going forward if cov-
erage is not required.138 
Second, payers might balk at covering even less-expensive 
cures, if the aggregate budgetary impact is sufficiently high. The 
recently developed hepatitis C cures are the primary example 
here. The first of these drugs to be approved, Sovaldi, retailed 
for $84,000 per course.139 Although the drug cures hepatitis C in 
the vast majority of patients, making the drug a one-time ex-
penditure rather than a chronic expense, states could not afford 
to provide the drug to all of their hepatitis C patients enrolled in 
Medicaid.140 Medicare experienced a similar spike in spending 
once the drugs were introduced.141 
Most state Medicaid programs initially restricted access to 
these drugs beyond what was deemed medically necessary. For 
instance, many states required patients to demonstrate particu-
larly severe levels of liver disease or to demonstrate their absti-
nence from the use of illegal substances for particular periods of 
time before providing access to the medications.142 
As in the case of Kalydeco, these restrictions were met with 
lawsuits or demand letters in a number of states,143 with the 
 
 138. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas J. Betlach, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Med-
icaid Dirs. (NAMD), & John B. McCarthy, Vice President, NAMD, to Fred Up-
ton, Representative & Frank Pallone, Representative 2 (Apr. 8, 2015), http:// 
www.medicaiddirectors.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/namd_letter_to_ 
congress_21st_century_cures.pdf. 
 139. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENG’G & MED., A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 
ELIMINATION OF HEPATITIS B AND C: PHASE TWO REPORT 151 (Gillian J. Buck-
ley & Brian L. Strom eds., 2017). Again, importantly, state Medicaid programs 
were able to obtain these drugs at significant discounts, especially once compe-
tition was introduced into the market with the approval of Viekira Pak months 
later. See id. at 165. 
 140. See Joshua Sharfstein et al., We Have a Cure for Hepatitis C. but the 
Neediest Can’t Afford It. Louisiana Wants to Change That., VOX (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/9/27/16350562/hepatitis-c-drug 
-prices-louisiana. 
 141. Charles Ornstein, New Hepatitis C Drugs Are Costing Medicare Bil-
lions, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
health-science/medicare-spent-45-billion-on-new-hepatitis-c-drugs-last-year 
-data-shows/2015/03/29/66952dde-d32a-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html. 
 142. See CTR. FOR HEALTH LAW & POLICY INNOVATION, HEPATITIS C: THE 
STATE OF MEDICAID ACCESS 5–9 (2016). 
 143. See, e.g., JoNel Aleccia, Lawsuit Targets Medicaid Policy that Limits 
Spendy Hepatitis C Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www 
.seattletimes.com/news//lawsuit-targets-medicaid-policy-that-limits-spendy 
-hep-c-drugs; ACLU Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Colorado Medicaid over 
Unlawful Hepatitis C Treatment Restrictions, ACLU COLO. (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://aclu-co.org/aclu-files-class-action-lawsuit-colorado-medicaid-unlawful 
-hepatitis-c-treatment-restrictions; Jen Rini, State Changes Hep C Medication 
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cases resolved in the patients’ favor.144 Drugs like these may also 
be excluded, or at least significantly limited, if coverage is not 
required. 
Finally, in the private-insurance market, we may expect 
companies to engage in business practices designed to attract 
healthy, low-cost individuals to their plans and discourage 
sicker, high-cost individuals from enrolling. This practice, re-
ferred to as “cream skimming,” has been known in the literature 
for decades.145 The ACA made it more difficult for insurers to 
engage in these practices, through the essential health benefits 
requirement and the nondiscrimination provisions of the Act.146 
But discrimination has persisted. Recent lawsuits alleged 
that insurance companies were discriminating against patients 
with HIV/AIDS in an effort to discourage the patients from sign-
ing up for their plans. Specifically, the insurers would place most 
of the drugs needed for this condition in the highest cost-sharing 
tier, requiring patients to pay far more out of pocket for their 
treatment.147 Alternatively, they would decline to cover a suffi-
cient number of drugs within each category, preventing physi-
cians from providing their patients with the most effective treat-
ment options.148 Practices like these would likely increase if 
coverage were not required on nondiscriminatory terms. 
Importantly, in none of these three cases is there a question 
about whether the drugs are effective. There may be questions 
about whether the efficacy produced by these drugs is worth 
their price, but in each case, there is clear evidence to support 
the use of these drugs in at least some patient populations.149 As 
 
Guidelines, Avoids Lawsuit, NEWS JOURNAL (June 7, 2016), https://www 
.delawareonline.com/story/news/health/2016/06/07/state-changes-hep-c 
-medication-guidelines-avoids-lawsuit/85554396. 
 144. See, e.g., JoNel Aleccia, Judge Orders Washington Medicaid To Provide 
Lifesaving Hepatitis C Drugs for All, SEATTLE TIMES (May 28, 2016), https:// 
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/judge-orders-apple-health-to-cover 
-hepatitis-c-drugs-for-all. 
 145. See, e.g., Joseph P. Newhouse, Cream Skimming, Asymmetric Infor-
mation, and a Competitive Insurance Market, 3 J. HEALTH ECON. 97, 97 (1984). 
 146. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012). 
 147. Michelle Andrews, Seven Insurers Alleged to Have Discriminated 
Against HIV Patients, NPR (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health 
-shots/2016/10/18/498427561/7-insurers-alleged-to-have-discrimated-against 
-hiv-patients. 
 148. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights Administrative Complaint at 5–7, In re 
Anthem Silver Level QHPs in Wisconsin (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.chlpi.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/12/WI-ANTHEM.pdf. 
 149. See Andrews, supra note 147; Herper, supra note 134; Sharfstein et al., 
supra note 140. 
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such, insurer practices like these should give us pause about the 
idea of delinking approval and reimbursement without appropri-
ate safeguards. If Medicare or Medicaid had been aiming to ex-
clude a subset of drugs which have been approved with insuffi-
cient evidence of their efficacy,150 that might produce less 
concerning results. But if we could expect payers to exclude or 
discriminate against patients where the drugs are highly effec-
tive, we ought to be concerned about that potential policy out-
come from an access perspective. 
B. ENCOURAGING INFORMATION PRODUCTION 
Other potential policy implications of delinkage are more 
positive. Perhaps most usefully for future innovation, if approval 
and reimbursement were delinked, pharmaceutical companies 
would know that they must earn insurance coverage. As such, 
they might choose to run their clinical trials differently, to pro-
duce more socially valuable information. This is likely to be true 
in at least two senses. First, we might gain more information 
about the social value of particular drugs in an objective sense. 
And second, we might gain more information about the compar-
ative efficacy of particular products within a class. 
First, public payers in particular might decline to pay for 
FDA-approved products which have not demonstrated sufficient 
evidence of safety and efficacy. More specifically, they might de-
cline to pay for products that were approved on the basis of ques-
tionable surrogate endpoints. “A surrogate endpoint . . . is a la-
boratory measurement or a physical sign used as a substitute for 
a clinically meaningful endpoint that measures directly how a 
patient feels, functions, or survives.”151 A classic example of a 
surrogate endpoint is cholesterol. Drugs may be tested based on 
their ability to lower a patient’s level of cholesterol, a surrogate 
endpoint, rather than on their ability to decrease the risk of 
death from heart disease, the true endpoint. If drugs approved 
on the basis of their ability to lower cholesterol levels do not ac-
tually lower the risk of death from heart disease,152 payers may 
 
 150. See infra text accompanying notes 215–26 (discussing Massachusetts’s 
proposed section 1115 waiver). 
 151. See Robert J. Temple, A Regulatory Authority’s Opinion About Surro-
gate Endpoints, in CLINICAL MEASUREMENT IN DRUG EVALUATION 3, 4 (Walter 
S. Nimmo & Geoffrey T. Tucker eds., 1995); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2017) 
(explaining that a new drug may be given market approval if the drug impacts 
a surrogate endpoint). 
 152. See, e.g., Brendan M. Everett et al., Reducing LDL with PCSK9 Inhibi-
tors—the Clinical Benefit of Lipid Drugs, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1588, 1589–90 
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be reticent to pay for new drugs which do not come with evidence 
of the true endpoint. 
There are some surrogate endpoints which may have value 
on their own. Consider cancer drug approvals. Two-thirds of can-
cer drugs are now approved on the basis of surrogate endpoints, 
such as whether solid tumors have shrunk, or how long the pa-
tient was able to survive without their cancer progressing or re-
curring.153 Yet often there is no evidence as to whether these 
drugs actually enable patients to live longer—and in many cases 
there is evidence that the drug has no overall survival benefit.154 
It may be that cancer patients value progression-free survival 
even if there is no overall survival benefit.155 But payers, pa-
tients, and physicians would benefit from knowing both pieces of 
information about a particular product. 
Second, in a delinked reimbursement world we may gain ad-
ditional information about the comparative costs and benefits of 
different drugs in a particular class. Today, this information is 
scarce. Fewer drugs are approved on the basis of clinical trials 
involving competing products, either direct or indirect competi-
tors. For rare conditions and particularly for rare cancers, it is 
increasingly common for products to be approved on the basis of 
a single-arm trial,156 in which the effects of the therapy to be 
tested are not compared to the effects of any other intervention, 
either placebo or comparator. In such circumstances, it may be 
difficult for physicians to decide which new products they should 
prescribe for their patients, where a choice is permissible.157 
 
(2015). 
 153. Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Cancer Drugs Approved on the Basis of a 
Surrogate End Point and Subsequent Overall Survival: An Analysis of Five 
Years of U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approvals, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
INTERNAL MED. 1992, 1992 (2015). 
 154. Id. at 1993. 
 155. See Lesley J. Fallowfield & Anne Fleissig, The Value of Progression-Free 
Survival to Patients with Advanced-Stage Cancer, 9 NATURE REVIEWS CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY 41, 45 (2012) (discussing an end-of-life care study in which seventy-
two percent of patients preferred symptom-directed therapy over life-extending 
therapy). 
 156. See, e.g., Himabindu Gaddipati et al., Rare Cancer Trial Design: Les-
sons from FDA Approvals, 18 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 5172, 5176 (2012). 
 157. INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, POLY ADP-RIBOSE POLYMERASE 
(PARP) INHIBITORS FOR OVARIAN CANCER: EFFECTIVENESS AND VALUE 38 
(2017), https://icer-review.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MWCEPAC_ 
OVARIAN_FINAL_EVIDENCE_REPORT_10112017.pdf. 
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Companies also have little incentive to demonstrate the 
safety and efficacy of their products relative to potential compet-
itors, as long as insurers must cover both. Currently, in order to 
demonstrate the comparative benefit of their product, a company 
may need to run a particularly large, expensive trial, powered to 
detect potential differences between two similar products.158 
Further, the company runs the risk that their trial may show no 
benefit relative to their competitor, or that their competitor may 
even emerge superior.159 Thus companies are unlikely to expend 
the time and money to conduct these trials where the result may 
harm, not help, their market share. 
Giving payers more control over the choice of products they 
cover and the organization of their formularies may improve 
pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to produce more infor-
mation about their products and to differentiate between prod-
ucts in a class through the development of comparative-effective-
ness data. Payers might decline to cover drugs approved on the 
basis of more novel surrogate endpoints, or might manage to 
strike innovative contracting deals (such as money-back require-
ments) to cover such drugs until sufficient data is produced. Fur-
ther, payers would likely give preferred formulary placement to 
drugs which can demonstrate superior safety or efficacy. Evi-
dence-based physicians are likely to support these efforts, as it 
would enable them to determine which drug in a particular class 
would best fit the needs of their patients. 
C. ADDRESSING THE DRUG PRICING PROBLEM 
Third, delinkage also would likely help address the prob-
lems of high drug prices and spending, precisely because of both 
of the above considerations addressed in this Part. There is gen-
eral agreement that drug prices are too high,160 although, to be 
sure, there is much less agreement as to which drug prices are 
 
 158. See generally Daniel Garrun, Clinical Trial Delays: America’s Patient 
Recruitment Dilemma, DRUG DEV. TECH. (July 18, 2012), http://www 
.drugdevelopment-technology.com/features/featureclinical-trial-patient 
-recruitment (discussing the obstacles clinical trials face in both expense and 
volunteer recruitment). 
 159. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and 
the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1923–28 (2013) (“[T]here are asym-
metrical incentives to provide positive and negative information about new 
drugs.”). 
 160. See FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-52, § 609, 131 
Stat. 1005, 1051 (expressing the need for Congress to take action to “lower the 
costs of prescription drugs”); Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 109. 
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too high, and whether it is individual or aggregate costs that are 
more problematic. For instance, some products may not be con-
sidered worth their high prices because they do not provide sig-
nificant social value, while others may be worth their prices but 
impose budgetary concerns in the aggregate.161 Nevertheless, 
pharmaceuticals make up a significant share of overall 
healthcare spending, and pharmaceutical spending is growing 
quickly,162 such that more serious efforts to lower either unit 
prices or overall spending may soon be necessary. 
Delinkage can help address these problems. A payer that 
can credibly follow through on the threat not to cover a particu-
lar product can likely extract greater discounts in agreeing to 
cover it. Alternatively, the payer could nudge patients toward 
cheaper but similarly effective products through formulary man-
agement. Relatedly, our ability to distinguish between high-
value and low-value pharmaceuticals may improve with an in-
creased amount of comparative-effectiveness research. This re-
search may enable payers to offer better quality of care at the 
same prices they had previously been paying, and to promote op-
timal treatment incentives among physicians and patients. 
IV.  CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE MODELS   
A logical question to ask at this point is whether there are 
systems in which delinkage has occurred that might serve as 
models to interrogate this thought experiment. Specifically, we 
might look at different models of delinkage and consider whether 
these predictions have been met. There are at least three poten-
tial delinkage models to consider: (1) the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA); (2) the pharmaceutical approval and re-
imbursement system in a number of European countries; and (3) 
the system of medical device approvals in the United States. 
These models reveal that delinkage is likely to result in de-
creased access but also decreased prices, as predicted in Part III. 
 
 161. Ari B. Friedman & Janet Weiner, What’s the Story with Drug Prices?: 
The Plot Thickens, LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON. (May 30, 2016), 
https://ldi.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/what’s-story-drug-prices. 
 162. National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/ 
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/ 
highlights.pdf (last visited June 18, 2018) (noting that retail prescription drug 
spending grew by 8.9% in 2015, to encompass ten percent of overall health ex-
penditures). Importantly, this is an underestimate, as it does not account for 
drugs administered through the Part B program. 
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However, the potential for using delinkage to develop more in-
formation about drugs may be more difficult to realize. 
Importantly, none of these three models provides perfect in-
formation about what is likely to happen in the event of delink-
age. The VA example exists within the United States, but its 
overall magnitude and interaction with the rest of the healthcare 
system may impair its generalizability. The European example 
approaches a similar scale, but the different regulatory culture 
and market incentives may limit its applicability as well. Fi-
nally, the medical-device approval system is premised on a very 
different view of the FDA than is the drug approval system, lim-
iting its relevance. As a result, the fact that we fail to see in-
creased information production in any of these three cases may 
not be dispositive. 
But these results still matter for policy-based assessments 
of delinkage’s impact. At its core, delinkage by necessity will 
have some negative impact on access, even if it is narrowly tai-
lored, and will likely also have a salutary impact on drug pricing. 
This tradeoff is one that policymakers in the United States have 
so far been unwilling to make.163 Where the relative magnitude 
of these potential changes is unknown, there is understandable 
concern about making this tradeoff. However, if there is an ad-
ditional social benefit to delinkage in the form of increased infor-
mation production about these therapies, that benefit might em-
bolden policymakers to take steps toward delinkage. If we have 
reason to doubt that there would be such an additional benefit, 
that doubt is similarly important to policymakers as they make 
decisions about drug pricing policy. 
 
 163. In part, their unwillingness is also driven by concerns about the rela-
tionship between price and innovation. When faced with the prospect of policy 
reforms that have the potential to lower their revenues, pharmaceutical compa-
nies respond by arguing that their ability to innovate and to develop new drugs 
will be impaired. See, e.g., Jay Taylor, Government-Imposed Price Controls 
Threaten Innovation and Access, PHRMA: THE CATALYST (May 9, 2017), https:// 
catalyst.phrma.org/government-imposed-price-controls-threaten-innovation 
-and-access. This Article does not grapple directly with their arguments, other 
than to present them obliquely infra in Part IV.C, but it is reasonable to think 
that the scope and content of any proposed price reform would matter in the 
innovation calculus. 
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A. THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
In the United States, many veterans are entitled to publicly 
funded health care through the VA.164 Like Medicaid, the VA is 
entitled by law to a large statutory discount—twenty-four per-
cent—off of the nonfederal AMP for the product.165 But unlike 
Medicaid, the VA is further entitled to create formularies and 
exclude particular drugs from coverage.166 Because these formu-
laries are created at the national level,167 the VA can leverage 
its purchasing power to obtain greater discounts on particular 
products. 
The VA’s program clearly bears out two of the three hypoth-
eses described in Part III. First, the VA’s program lowers prices 
significantly as compared to Medicare and Medicaid. Estimates 
suggest that the VA pays on average sixty percent of the prices 
paid by Part D plans.168 And although the large statutory dis-
counts available to Medicaid bring its prices closer to the range 
paid by the VA, estimates suggest that even Medicaid pays more 
than the VA for a significant minority of drugs.169 
Second, the VA’s program does lead to some decrease in ac-
cess. One study noted that although private Medicare Part D 
plans cover on average eighty-five percent of the top-selling 200 
drugs in the country, the VA national formulary covers only fifty-
nine percent of these drugs.170 As noted above, whether this de-
crease in access is a problem depends on the type and value of 
drugs being excluded from the formulary.171 But the fact that 
 
 164. Most veterans must meet a minimum duty requirement first. Health 
Benefits: Veterans Eligibility, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/ 
healthbenefits/apply/veterans.asp (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 165. 38 U.S.C. § 8126(a)(2) (2012). 
 166. Austin B. Frakt et al., Controlling Prescription Drug Costs: Regulation 
and the Role of Interest Groups in Medicare and the Veterans Health Admin-
istration, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1079, 1081 (2008). 
 167. Id. at 1087. 
 168. Austin B. Frakt et al., Should Medicare Adopt the Veterans Health Ad-
ministration Formulary?, 21 HEALTH ECON. 485, 487 (2012). 
 169. Thomas J. Hwang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Public Referendum on Drug 
Prices in the US: Will It Bring Relief?, 355 BRITISH MED. J. 1, 2 (2016) (estimat-
ing that Medicaid likely pays more than the VA for thirty-three percent of drugs 
by thirty percent on average). The VA is statutorily excluded from the calcula-
tion of the Medicaid best-price rule, as discussed throughout this Article. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(i)(I) (2012). 
 170. Frakt et al., supra note 168, at 490–91. 
 171. At least initially, the VA imposed restrictions on access to the new hep-
atitis C drugs similar to what has been observed in the Medicaid context. Patri-
cia Kime, VA Expands Hepatitis C Treatment to All Patients with the Virus, 
MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/ 
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roughly one-third of VA patients with Medicare report having 
additional prescription drug coverage through Part D plans sug-
gests that they are using such coverage to supplement the VA’s 
more restrictive formulary.172 
However, it does not appear that the VA’s delinkage has had 
much of an impact on the development of information about the 
comparative effectiveness of different products approved for the 
same indication. Importantly, the VA is hoping to change this. 
In mid-2017, the agency announced a partnership with the In-
stitute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) to better enable 
the agency to develop and use information about comparative 
clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness in their formulary 
management process.173 Further, the VA is a relatively small 
program as compared to Medicare and Medicaid, serving 8.9 mil-
lion Americans.174 In spending terms, the VA estimates that it 
will spend just under seven billion dollars on drugs in 2017,175 
far less than either Medicare or Medicaid.176 It may be that the 
size of the delinked market is insufficient to spur companies to 
produce information that could then be used in the larger, linked 
market. 
B. EUROPEAN DELINKAGE MODELS 
A second model of delinkage exists in most European coun-
tries. In these systems, approval by the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) or national regulator does not dictate coverage 
requirements or terms on a national level. Consider the United 
Kingdom’s system, perhaps the most well-studied model. Once a 
 
2016/03/09/va-expands-hepatitis-c-treatment-to-all-patients-with-the-virus; 
Rini, supra note 143. 
 172. GRACE HUANG ET AL., 2016 SURVEY OF VETERAN ENROLLEES’ HEALTH 
AND USE OF HEALTH CARE 47 (2017), https://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICY 
PLANNING/SoE2016/2016_Survey_of_Veteran_Enrollees_Health_and_ 
Health_Care.pdf. VA patients who have private insurance overwhelmingly re-
port (eighty-two percent) that their private insurance includes a prescription 
benefit. Id. at 46. 
 173. Press Release, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, The Insti-
tute for Clinical and Economic Review To Collaborate with the Department of 
Veterans Affairs’ Pharmacy Benefits Management Services Office (June 27, 
2017), https://icer-review.org/announcements/va-release. 
 174. HUANG ET AL., supra note 172, at 2. 
 175. U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., MEDICAL PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS VHA-207 (2017), https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/ 
summary/fy2018VabudgetVolumeIImedicalProgramsAndInformation 
Technology.pdf. 
 176. See Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38. 
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drug is approved by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Reg-
ulatory Agency (MHRA) or the EMA, the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) conducts “technology ap-
praisals”177 on new drugs and makes recommendations to the 
United Kingdom National Health Service (NHS) regarding re-
imbursement and use of the drug.178 NICE considers not just the 
clinical evidence for the drug, but also its economic evidence—
does the drug represent good value for money? NICE is likely to 
recommend drugs for coverage by the NHS where the cost per 
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is between £20,000 and 
£30,000 per QALY gained.179 
NICE’s technology-appraisal system, coupled with the lack 
of a coverage mandate, means that nearly all branded drugs are 
less expensive in the United Kingdom than they are through 
Medicare.180 But this decrease in price does come with a decrease 
in access. NICE does not recommend that all drugs be covered, 
and for certain types of drugs—particularly expensive cancer 
drugs—this lack of coverage has created political problems for 
the program.181 In 2011, the NHS created the Cancer Drugs 
Fund, devoting over £200 million to provide cancer drugs not 
covered by the NHS.182 While the Fund was originally scheduled 
to end in 2014, it was extended until 2016 with its expenditure 
during 2015–2016 amounting to £466 million.183 The United 
Kingdom has now implemented a new model for appraising and 
 
 177. Technology Appraisal Guidance, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE EX-
CELLENCE, https://www.nice.org.uk/About/What-we-do/Our-Programmes/NICE 
-guidance/NICE-technology-appraisal-guidance (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Of course, if the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is less than 
£20,000, NHS would prefer that. NICE has even created a fast track appraisal 
(FTA) process for the most cost-effective treatments, where “the company’s 
base-case incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is less than £10,000 per 
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.” Our Processes, NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our 
-programmes/nice-guidance/nice-technology-appraisal-guidance/process (last 
visited June 18, 2018). 
 180. See Jeanne Whalen, Why the U.S. Pays More than Other Countries for 
Drugs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s 
-pays-more-than-other-countries-for-drugs-1448939481. 
 181. See, e.g., Health Economics: The Cancer Drugs Cost Conundrum, CAN-
CER RES. UK (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/funding-for 
-researchers/research-features/2016-08-10-health-economics-the-cancer 
-drugs-cost-conundrum. 
 182. NHS ENGLAND CANCER DRUGS FUND TEAM, APPRAISAL AND FUNDING 
OF CANCER DRUGS 5 (July 2016), https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/04/cdf-sop.pdf. 
 183. Id.  
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reimbursing all cancer drugs under the Fund,184 which includes 
a new category of recommendations when NICE considers there 
to be “plausible potential for a drug to satisfy the criteria for rou-
tine commissioning, but where there is significant remaining 
clinical uncertainty.”185 
This new program is designed to encourage the development 
of additional clinical information about these products even after 
they come to market. Once NICE recommends a drug as a Fund 
candidate under this new category, the drug’s final coverage 
through the fund depends on the pharmaceutical company ac-
cepting the requirements of the Fund under a Managed Access 
Agreement,186 which includes the Fund Commercial Agree-
ment.187 This Agreement is “a confidential agreement between 
NHS England and the pharmaceutical company, with input from 
NICE,” and determines the level of reimbursement during the 
managed-access period.188 When there is sufficient data to ad-
dress the original clinical uncertainty, the drug begins the pro-
cess of exiting the Fund.189 NICE then reappraises the drug re-
sulting in a positive or negative recommendation for routine 
commissioning.190 With this new model of appraisal and funding 
for cancer drugs, NHS hopes to provide patients with increased 
access to these medications, to “drive stronger value for money 
for taxpayers in drugs expenditure,” and to offer “a new fast-
track route to NHS funding” for pharmaceutical companies will-
ing to price drugs responsibly.191 
To date, the delinked systems present throughout much of 
Europe have not produced the kind of additional information 
about comparative effectiveness that might be the result of de-
linkage, as hypothesized in Part III.C.192 The United Kingdom 
in particular has produced a wealth of cost-effectiveness infor-
mation about these products, but comparative effectiveness data 
about drugs in a particular class are still lacking. It may be that 
a more carefully designed system, on a broader scale, would be 
needed to produce that information. 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 6. 
 186. Id. at 16. 
 187. Id. at 17. 
 188. Id. at 18. 
 189. Id. at 22–23. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 6. 
 192. See supra Part III.C. 
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C. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION 
In the United States, there has historically been little or no 
link between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement for 
medical devices, particularly through CMS. As a result, medical-
device companies have had to navigate two separate regulatory 
systems: they must both obtain FDA approval and proceed 
through CMS’s national-coverage determination to secure Med-
icare reimbursement for their device.193 But the FDA and CMS 
apply different legal standards to those determinations,194 re-
sulting in substantial uncertainty for device companies about 
whether the information generated in the FDA approval process 
will be sufficient to support a CMS coverage determination.195 
Even where a company has produced sufficient information, the 
additional time required to go through the CMS coverage deter-
mination process after FDA approval is costly both for the com-
pany and for patients who may want to access the device in ques-
tion. 
The system of medical-device approval and coverage in the 
United States is in some ways too distinct from our regulatory 
structure around drugs to compare directly the impact of this 
delinkage on price, access, and the development of comparative-
effectiveness information. Many devices are regulated only 
lightly196 or using an abbreviated follow-on pathway, in a way 
 
 193. LIZ RICHARDSON, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: ALIGNING FDA AND CMS RE-
VIEW 2 (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20150827 
.132391/full/healthpolicybrief_143.pdf. 
 194. The FDA ensures that devices are “safe and effective.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360e(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that applicants for medical device premarket 
approval must show “whether or not such device is safe and effective”). CMS 
covers products that are “reasonable and necessary.” See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that “no payment may be made . . . for any 
expenses incurred for items or services . . . not reasonable and necessary for the 
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a 
malformed body member”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (describing part of 
the FDA’s mission as “ensuring that . . . human and veterinary drugs are safe 
and effective”). 
 195. RICHARDSON, supra note 193 (“This can lead to cases in which the FDA 
approves a product that is subsequently denied Medicare coverage because the 
evidence collected in pivotal clinical trials does not meet the ‘reasonable and 
necessary’ bar.”). 
 196. Medical devices are regulated under a risk-based framework. Under 
this system, low-risk (designated as Class I) devices, such as tongue depressors, 
are subject only to “general controls,” such as reporting and adherence to good 
manufacturing practices. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). By contrast, high-risk (des-
ignated as Class III) devices, such as artificial hearts, are subject to more strin-
gent controls, typically including premarket approval requirements. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(1)(C); see also Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving 
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that does not resemble the pharmaceutical approval pathway.197 
Many laboratory diagnostics (which arguably fall under the stat-
utory definition of “device”)198 are essentially unregulated by the 
FDA,199 and CMS even sets rates for their reimbursement.200 
This divergent approval structure means that it is difficult to de-
termine whether we should expect to observe the development of 
comparative-effectiveness information in the device context. 
However, there is still an important lesson to be gleaned from 
the system of medical-device approval and coverage. 
Specifically, the medical-device system provides a window 
into how the regulated industry may react when faced with two 
separate regulatory systems they must satisfy. Medical-device 
companies do not like having to deal with separate regulators. 
They complain about the cost and uncertainty of the process, and 
they argue that it makes attracting venture capital funding for 
innovation difficult.201 They would undoubtedly prefer to have 
FDA approval automatically trigger insurance reimbursement. 
Pharmaceutical companies worry even today about the bur-
dens placed on them by the FDA approval process. If they must 
 
the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1894–95 
(2016) (explaining the FDA’s risk classification system). 
 197. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 510(k), 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012). 
See generally Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence Premarket Review: 
The Right Approach for Most Medical Devices, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365 (2014) 
(discussing § 510(k) and suggesting that substantial equivalence is a sound ap-
proach for most medical devices). 
 198. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the FDA the authority 
to regulate any medical device, defined as “an instrument, apparatus, imple-
ment, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or re-
lated article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended 
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment or prevention of disease.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (emphasis added). 
 199. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS 5 (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www 
.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
GuidanceDocuments/UCM416685.pdf. 
 200. The Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule sets the rates at which Medicare 
will reimburse outpatient laboratory testing services. Clinical Laboratory Fee 
Schedule (2014), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms 
.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ClinicalLabFeeSched/ 
Clinical-Laboratory-Fee-Schedule-Files-Items/14CLAB.html (last visited June 
18, 2018). 
 201. INNOVATION COUNSELLORS, A FUTURE AT RISK: ECONOMIC PERFOR-
MANCE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND VENTURE CAPITAL IN THE U.S. MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 25 (Oct. 2016), https://www.advamed.org/sites/default/ 
files/resource/a_future_at_risk_advamed_october_2016.pdf. 
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satisfy both regulators, we can expect their concern with the sys-
tem to increase accordingly. As such, we might consider whether 
programs that have been developed to lower the cost and uncer-
tainty of development in the medical-device context might be ex-
tended to pharmaceuticals in the event that a delinkage proposal 
is implemented. These programs still permit the two regulatory 
systems to function independently, but ameliorate some of the 
additional regulatory burden they might impose. 
At least two such systems have already been developed. The 
first is a parallel review program, allowing medical-device prod-
uct sponsors to request that CMS begin the coverage-determina-
tion process while the product is still under review by the 
FDA.202 The idea is to partially collapse the two review timelines 
and permit product sponsors to anticipate and develop the data 
needed by both agencies. The program was formally made per-
manent in 2016,203 although in its first five years of operation, 
just a single device was approved through the program—Co-
loguard, a noninvasive colorectal-cancer screening test.204 If 
used more widely,205 the parallel review program should reduce 
the cost and uncertainty faced by medical-device companies in 
dealing with separate regulatory bodies. 
The second such system is coverage with evidence develop-
ment (CED). The idea is to permit CMS to provide reimburse-
ment for particular technologies on the condition that the man-
ufacturers continue to gather clinical data about the 
technologies.206 That data can later be used to evaluate more 
 
 202. Program for Parallel Review of Medical Devices, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,113 
(Oct. 24, 2016). 
 203. Id. 
 204. RICHARDSON, supra note 193, at 4. It is worth noting that at least one 
other product, from Medtronic, failed to demonstrate efficacy in its Phase III 
trial and thus did not complete the program. Id. 
 205. It is unclear why medical device companies have not yet embraced the 
program. Reports supported by AdvaMed, the trade organization representing 
the industry, state only that the parallel review program “has limitations and 
would require modification[s]” to achieve its goals. INNOVATION COUNSELLORS, 
supra note 201. However, it is unclear what modifications they would like to 
see. Id. 
 206. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF, NATIONAL 
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COV-
ERAGE: COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT (July 12, 2006), https:// 
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationProcess/downloads/ced.pdf. 
Coverage with evidence development is also available for services (not only tech-
nologies), but for my purposes I have focused on its relationship to health care 
technology products. Id. 
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fully the technology for an official coverage determination. CMS 
has implemented CED protocols roughly twenty times,207 but in 
only two cases has CMS used the process to revise its coverage 
determination.208 More rigorous use of CED to review the cover-
age of promising but ultimately investigational devices might 
provide a sample framework for use in the drug context as 
well.209 
V.  THEORIZING INTERMEDIATE SOLUTIONS   
Policymakers wishing to achieve the potential benefits of de-
linkage while avoiding the potential social costs may wish to de-
sign guardrails more purposefully to achieve these outcomes. 
Simply removing the requirements that payers cover particular 
classes of drugs may achieve some cost savings, but it is likely to 
have a detrimental effect on access in a way that is not neces-
sarily evidence-based, and it may be unlikely to lead to the de-
velopment of comparative-effectiveness information on its own. 
This Part considers three potential intermediate solutions, each 
of which would balance the benefits and costs of delinkage. 
Importantly, each of these intermediate solutions is moti-
vated by a different theoretical model of the purpose of the FDA 
and its relationship to insurance reimbursement. On the view 
that the FDA’s central purpose is to approve safe, effective drugs 
and CMS’s central purpose is to provide access to those drugs, 
partial delinkage models that focus on evidence development 
may be attractive. On the view that gives primacy to the role of 
the FDA as an information-generating agency, solutions that 
provide CMS with an opportunity to direct the development of 
the relevant evidence may be helpful. And on a view of both 
agencies as driven to promote socially valuable innovation, rea-
ligning payment incentives with the development of clinical trial 
information would be important. 
 
 207. RICHARDSON, supra note 193, at 3. Examples may be found at Coverage 
with Evidence Development, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https:// 
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/Coverage-with-Evidence-Development (last 
visited June 18, 2018). 
 208. RICHARDSON, supra note 193, at 3. 
 209. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for Broad Ge-
nomic Tests in Oncology, 358 SCIENCE 1133, 1134 (2017). 
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A. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PARTIAL DELINKAGE 
One traditional view of the FDA emphasizes its consumer 
protection function.210 On this view, the public must be able to 
trust that when they purchase a prescription drug, the FDA’s 
stamp of approval means that the product is safe and effective. 
The Agency’s reputation matters.211 On the other side, a tradi-
tional view of payers, and of Medicare and Medicaid in particu-
lar, is to help ensure that patients can access and afford needed 
medical care.212 Whether at their creation in 1965 or their ex-
pansions decades later, politicians have emphasized the im-
portance of these programs in providing not just care, but finan-
cial stability.213 
For those holding strong versions of both of these views (con-
sumer protection and access), a strong legal link between FDA 
approval and insurance coverage may be logically attractive. If 
the FDA only approves products that have been shown to be safe 
and effective, and if the purpose of insurance is to help patients 
afford needed medical care, surely insurers should cover a wide 
range of therapies. This perspective does not logically require the 
precise system Medicare and Medicaid have now, but it might be 
consistent with a requirement to cover a certain number of drugs 
per class, or to prevent discrimination on the basis of particular 
health conditions. 
However, this linkage only holds true if the FDA is approv-
ing only products that have been proven to be safe and effective. 
As described in Parts I and II above, the FDA now approves a 
whole range of drugs that have not yet been shown to be effective 
for their target indication. When the FDA is approving drugs on 
the basis of surrogate endpoints with labels stating that “[a] clin-
ical benefit . . . has not been established,”214 does paying for such 
products really serve the purpose of ensuring access to care? It 
 
 210. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 367, 387 (2007). 
 211. CARPENTER, supra note 102, at 10–11 (discussing the regulatory power 
of the FDA gained through reputation). 
 212. See STARR, supra note 28, at 367; Ruger, supra note 23, at 220. 
 213. See, e.g., Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, Celebrating 35 Years of Medicare 
and Medicaid, 22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 1 (2000) (quoting President 
Johnson signing Medicare and Medicaid into law); Dan Collins, Bush Signs 
Medicare Bill, CBS (Oct. 23, 2003), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-signs 
-medicare-bill (quoting President Bush at the signing ceremony for Medicare 
Part D as helping seniors “find affordable medical care in the later years of life”). 
 214. Highlights of Prescribing Information: EXONDYS 51, FDA (2016), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/206488lbl.pdf. 
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does not obviously do so in a system of limited resources. Simi-
larly, it may undermine trust in the FDA as a consumer regula-
tor. 
These dual goals might therefore be served by partial de-
linkage, where the delinkage is limited to certain classes of drugs 
or to drugs with particular characteristics. A thoughtful recent 
example of such a proposal comes from Massachusetts, whose 
Medicaid program has applied for a waiver of the prescription 
drug coverage requirements.215 Specifically, Massachusetts is 
seeking to make two kinds of changes to its program. First, to 
adopt a closed formulary of the type used by private payers and 
Medicare Part D plans to the extent they are permitted to select 
two drugs per class to cover.216 Second and more novel, to ex-
clude from the formulary entirely drugs “with limited or inade-
quate evidence of clinical efficacy.”217 
In requesting this second set of exclusions, Massachusetts is 
expressing concern about the interaction between the Medicaid 
coverage requirements and accelerated approval, as discussed 
above in Part I.218 Massachusetts is particularly worried about 
drugs coming to market through the accelerated approval path-
way which “have not yet demonstrated clinical benefit and have 
been studied in clinical trials using only surrogate endpoints.”219 
Importantly, Massachusetts does not seek to exclude such drugs 
entirely or indefinitely. Drugs that have demonstrated “incre-
mental clinical value relative to peer drugs” in their class would 
still be covered.220 But drugs that have yet to demonstrate such 
a benefit would be candidates for potential exclusion from the 
formulary. 
This second set of exclusions does not single out drugs on 
the basis of disease or even necessarily expense, although ex-
pense is certainly central to Massachusetts’s decision to ask for 
the waiver in the first place.221 Instead, it is focused on drugs 
approved on the basis of comparatively weaker evidence.222 As 
 
 215. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., MASSHEALTH SECTION 1115 DEMON-
STRATION AMENDMENT REQUEST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/ 
medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/downloads/ma/ma 
-masshealth-pa3.pdf. 
 216. Id. at 8–9. 
 217. Id. at 9. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 72–80. 
 219. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 215, at 9. 
 220. Id. at 10. 
 221. Id. at 8. 
 222. Id. at 9. 
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such, Massachusetts’s waiver application is designed to maxim-
ize the benefits and minimize the costs of delinkage. Massachu-
setts is clearly hoping to achieve some cost savings as a result of 
this delinkage, both directly (by excluding drugs for which there 
is little evidence of efficacy) and indirectly (by increasing their 
negotiation leverage over the drugs that remain). Massachu-
setts’s program also seems designed to lead to the production of 
information about the comparative effectiveness of new drugs.223 
At the same time, there would be some reduction in access 
to medicines. Massachusetts has thought seriously about ways 
to minimize the therapeutic effects of decreased access,224 but 
policymakers should carefully consider the patients who are 
likely to be impacted. If the reduction in access falls dispropor-
tionately on historically marginalized patients with certain dis-
eases (such as cancer or orphan conditions), policymakers might 
try to create other options for patients that impose financial risk 
on the drug companies, not the states. For instance, states im-
plementing proposals like these might be incentivized to strike 
outcomes-based deals with drug companies.225 The companies 
would agree to provide their products to particular patients, but 
they would be paid only if follow-on clinical trials demonstrated 
clear efficacy.226 
B. INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND INTERAGENCY 
COLLABORATION 
A more modern view of the FDA, represented most clearly 
by the work of Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, conceives of the 
FDA as an information-producing, innovation-focused agency.227 
As she has written, “If a century ago the goal of drug regulation 
was to protect people from poisons, today drug regulation guides 
 
 223. If adopted by Massachusetts alone, the threat of a formulary exclusion 
may not be sufficient to encourage companies to produce the relevant data sets. 
As noted in Part IV, supra, the size of the market may be too small to encourage 
companies to develop the information. 
 224. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 215, at 9 (detailing the pro-
posed exceptions process for patients who need access to excluded products). 
 225. Cf. Rachel E. Sachs et al., Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals 
and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 10 (2018). 
 226. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Considering the Side Ef-
fects of Drugmakers’ Money-Back Guarantees, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/health/prescription-drugs-cost.html (“It-
aly now asks drug companies to provide some of their products for free—at first. 
Manufacturers are only paid once results are demonstrated.”). 
 227. Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 348. 
 2018] DELINKING REIMBURSEMENT 2349 
 
the development of information that turns poisons, used advis-
edly, into drugs.”228 Eisenberg portrays the FDA’s clinical trial 
requirements as a tool to force pharmaceutical companies to pro-
duce information about the safety and efficacy of their prod-
ucts—information they would otherwise be unlikely to produce 
on their own.229 
Similarly, more modern views of insurers (particularly pub-
lic insurers) consider them not only as a means of providing ac-
cess to care for patients, but also as tools to encourage evidence- 
and value-based care. On this view, insurers can and should aim 
to compensate providers on the basis of the quality, not the quan-
tity, of the care they provide. In this vein, HHS is aiming to con-
tinue to increase the amount of reimbursement that is based on 
quality or value rather than volume.230 Unfortunately, to date 
this initiative has largely been limited to hospital and physician 
services.231 The coverage mandates described herein likely limit 
CMS’s ability to extend these new payment models from 
healthcare services to healthcare technologies. 
Under this set of views about the agencies’ purposes, it is 
not clear that there is a strong logical need to link approval and 
coverage as a matter of law. If the FDA is appropriately chan-
neling companies toward the production of information that is 
needed to enable insurers and physicians to make evidence- and 
value-based decisions about care, a coverage mandate would not 
obviously be necessary. A coverage mandate might even get in 
the way of payers’ attempts to obtain value-based prices for new 
medicines. That is, if FDA clinical-trial results show that a drug 
is likely to lead to a particular level of benefit, requiring insurers 
to cover that drug may permit its manufacturer to charge a price 
that is out of proportion to the value it provides. 
 
 228. Id. at 347. 
 229. See id. at 370; see also Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 159, at 1922. 
 230. Better, Smarter, Healthier, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170127185400/http://www 
.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/01/26/better-smarter-healthier-in-historic 
-announcement-hhs-sets-clear-goals-and-timeline-for-shifting-medicare 
-reimbursements-from-volume-to-value.html (setting goals “of tying 85 percent 
of all traditional Medicare payments to quality or value by 2016 and 90 percent 
by 2018”). 
 231. Cf. Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS Ef-
forts to Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897, 897 (2015) (em-
phasizing provider “teamwork and integration” and “effective coordination of 
providers across settings”); see infra text accompanying notes 247–48 (discuss-
ing the Administration’s cancellation of the Part B pharmaceutical demo). 
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A solution that adopts these perspectives of agency purpose 
might address the issue not necessarily by giving CMS or other 
payers the ability to decline to pay for FDA-approved drugs, but 
by giving them input into the FDA approval process to begin 
with. This can be done either procedurally or substantively, in a 
way that provides CMS with more or less power over the process. 
A procedural intervention which is merely exhortatory might in-
volve CMS in the process by which the FDA decides whether a 
potential new drug would be eligible for the Accelerated Ap-
proval program. As discussed in Part I, the program is intended 
to address “serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions and 
unmet medical needs.”232 But how is the FDA to know whether 
a particular condition qualifies as serious or whether the medical 
need is unmet? These determinations can be informed by evi-
dence possessed by CMS, in its role as insurer for over 
100,000,000 Americans.233 
Regulators might also imagine a program more akin to the 
parallel review program described above that the agencies have 
developed in the device context.234 Under this more substantive 
intervention, delinkage would be coupled with CMS involvement 
in the clinical-trials process. CMS would be able to recommend 
to pharmaceutical companies just beginning clinical trials the 
kinds of clinical evidence they would need to produce to achieve 
a formulary placement, or even a favorable one. At that point, 
companies could choose whether to complete the recommended 
trials. If they choose not to, they may obtain FDA approval—
with full knowledge that there may be little payer appetite for 
their products. And if they do complete the trials, FDA approval 
will bring the release of clinical-trial information that is far more 
useful to payers.235 
The impact of this intervention on the three potential out-
comes described above likely depends on the level at which the 
intervention is adopted. A program resembling parallel review 
has the potential to increase the production of information that 
is truly useful to the healthcare system, such as comparative-
effectiveness information, because such information is requested 
 
 232. 21 U.S.C. § 356(e)(1) (2012). 
 233. See FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES, supra note 21, at 
109–10. 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 202–05. 
 235. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting 
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 3, 15–24 (2017) 
(exploring potential opportunities for payers and examining the role health in-
surers may play separately in the development of such information). 
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ex ante and payers retain the ability to decline to pay for prod-
ucts approved without such information. A more procedural in-
tervention in which CMS provides assistance to the FDA in de-
termining which products should proceed through the 
accelerated-approval pathway, but which still requires CMS to 
cover such products once approved, would be unlikely to have an 
effect on the development of comparative-effectiveness evidence. 
One potential concern about this set of interventions is that 
they might decenter the role of the FDA in the drug approval 
process, elevating the role of CMS by comparison. Even as schol-
ars have come to view the FDA as serving this valuable infor-
mation-forcing function, to most patients it still holds its re-
spected consumer protection position.236 CMS has not needed to 
cultivate public trust in the same way, and arguably it has be-
come a site of more political strife since the passage of the ACA. 
Injecting CMS into the supposedly apolitical FDA approval pro-
cess237 might, in the eyes of some members of the public, taint 
that process. As such, policymakers might be especially cautious 
before requiring measures that go beyond information sharing. 
C. ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN AN INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM 
A third set of policy proposals comes from recognizing not 
only the FDA’s centrality in the development of innovative new 
therapies, but CMS’s role in the process as well. There are a 
number of FDA initiatives designed to promote innovation in so-
cially valuable areas that may be understudied by the private 
sector. For instance, the four expedited review programs de-
scribed above encourage companies to invest in new therapies 
for serious illnesses lacking existing treatments.238 As another 
example, the Orphan Drug Act provides extra incentives for com-
panies to study diseases affecting few Americans,239 which might 
 
 236. CARPENTER, supra note 102, at 10–11. 
 237. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 47 (2010) (“[T]he FDA is rel-
atively more independent than other executive agencies, with its heads often 
advocating for drug regulation regardless of the position of their appointing 
president.”). 
 238. See supra text accompanying notes 73–80. 
 239. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2012) (conferring seven years of market exclu-
sivity on orphan products); 26 U.S.C. § 45C(a) (2012) (conferring a fifty percent 
tax credit for eligible clinical trial expenses). However, Congress’s 2017 tax over-
haul reduced the credit to twenty-five percent. P.L. No. 115-97, 115th Cong., 
§ 13401(a) (“Modification of Orphan Drug Credit”). See also Daniel J. Hemel & 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents—Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
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not otherwise be serious topics of study.240 The process is not 
perfect, and there is much work left to do. But policymakers 
clearly understand the potential benefits of implementing inno-
vation-related policies through the FDA approval process. 
As of yet, policymakers have largely not viewed insurance 
generally, and CMS more specifically, as capable of advancing 
these policy goals.241 This is a mistake. As scholars have recog-
nized, prescription drug insurance closely resembles prize sys-
tems that have been theorized to provide incentives for the de-
velopment of new medicines.242 Pharmaceutical companies who 
know that insurers must pay for their products can rely on a cer-
tain level of rewards, and they may redirect their innovative ac-
tivities accordingly. For example, scholars have studied the cre-
ation of the Medicare Part D program, finding that 
 
REV. 303, 379 (2013) (describing how the Act increased government grants, 
market exclusivity, and tax credits for companies studying rare diseases). 
 240. Some have questioned whether the Orphan Drug Act has gone too far, 
however. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Tribble, Senator Grassley Launches Inquiry Into 
Orphan Drug Law’s Effect on Prices, NPR (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www 
.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/10/514373480/sen-grassley-launches 
-inquiry-into-orphan-drug-laws-effect-on-prices (stating that officials have be-
come interested in revisiting Orphan Drug legislation); Nicholas Bagley, INCI-
DENTAL ECONOMIST, The Benefits and Costs of Promoting the Development of 
New Orphan Drugs, pt. 3 (2017), https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2.12-orphan-drug.pdf (outlining the costs and 
problems surrounding Orphan Drug legislation). 
 241. Congress’s one foray into this area, Medicare’s New Technology Add-on 
Payment, directs CMS to create a procedure to identify new medical technolo-
gies and provide additional payments to encourage their use. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww (2012) (outlining the determination of costs and payments within hos-
pital services settings); see also Alexandra T. Clyde et al., Experience With Med-
icare’s New Technology Add-On Payment Program, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1632, 1632–
33 (2008) (“Without appropriate payment to the hospital at the point of use, 
technologies that provide value to patients and the health care system over time 
might not be available to patients.”). 
 242. See, e.g., William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoret-
ical, Empirical, and Historical Perspectives, at 12 (May 2, 2001), http://cyber 
.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf (discussing rewards as ways to 
stimulate innovation); see also, e.g., Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Re-
sistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 645–55 (2010) (discussing insurance reimbursement 
broadly, finding that they “are a key policy lever for antibiotic effective-
ness . . . .”); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of Intellectual Property: Health as a Case 
Study, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128–29 (2007) (stating that there is 
little difference between universal health-insurance schemes based on purchas-
ing and those based on prizes); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus 
Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1012–13 (2014) (describing 
government rewards for new drugs as similar to a prize system); Sachs, supra 
note 4, at 178 (finding that “prescription drug insurance strongly resembles a 
prize system”). 
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pharmaceutical companies engaged in increased investment into 
drug classes with higher consumption among the Medicare pop-
ulation when more seniors had access to comprehensive pre-
scription drug coverage.243 And yet to date, health insurance has 
traditionally been viewed by policymakers as a tool only for pro-
moting access to healthcare technologies. 
Recalibrating our view of insurance as a tool for promoting 
innovation as well as access reveals ways in which policymakers 
might realign reimbursement more closely with the FDA and in-
novation incentives. This is true for both relatively weak and rel-
atively strong interventions, and those along a spectrum in be-
tween. A relatively weak intervention would involve reforming 
the way in which physicians are reimbursed for prescribing and 
administering drugs under Medicare Part B. As discussed in 
Part I, many expensive biologics are administered in physicians’ 
offices and reimbursed under Part B.244 When the physician is 
reimbursed for providing the drug to her patients, she is reim-
bursed not based on the value of the drug she provides but in-
stead receives a fee based on a percentage of its price.245 Many 
scholars and policymakers have argued that this system may en-
courage physicians to prescribe and administer more expensive 
drugs than may be medically necessary.246 Providing a flat fee 
instead of a percentage would help nudge providers in the right 
direction from a prescription perspective. Relatedly, toward the 
end of the Obama Administration, CMS sought to implement 
 
 243. See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, The Impact of Medicare 
Part D on Pharmaceutical R&D 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 13857, 2008). But see Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market 
Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 
Q.J. ECON. 1049, 1084 (2004) (describing the effects profit incentives have on 
innovation as requiring further research); David Dranove et al., Pharmaceutical 
Profits and the Social Value of Innovation 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20212, 2014) (qualifying the findings of Blume-Kohout and 
Sood by noting that truly innovative activity takes longer to emerge). Relatedly, 
Professor Amy Finkelstein has discovered that several policies designed to in-
crease the uptake of vaccines (including Medicare’s 1993 decision to cover the 
flu vaccine) resulted in an increase in clinical trials for new vaccines. Amy 
Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the Vac-
cine Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 527, 556–57 (2004). 
 244. MEDPAC, supra note 4, at 121. 
 245. See id. at 117. 
 246. See id. at 118 (explaining that the reimbursement might incentivize 
physicians, noting that “a higher priced drug generates more revenue for the 
provider”); Patricia M. Danzon et al., Alternative Strategies for Medicare Pay-
ment of Outpatient Prescription Drugs—Part B and Beyond, 11 AM. J. MANAGED 
CARE 173, 173 (2005) (describing generally how reimbursement may result in 
higher prices for private and public purchasers). 
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such a program as a demonstration project.247 Industry groups, 
especially the oncologists that prescribe many of these drugs and 
the pharmaceutical companies that make them, objected vocifer-
ously and the program was never implemented.248 
An intermediate intervention may be implemented in the 
Medicaid program. Recall that Medicaid is entitled by law to 
large statutory discounts off of the average manufacturer price 
for a drug, or, if lower, the best price available to a specified 
group of payers.249 This is a sign of a program that is designed 
for access. The goal here is to spend as little as possible on each 
drug, to use scarce resources efficiently, and to care for as many 
people as possible. But at present, Medicaid likely dampens in-
centives to develop drugs primarily for low-income Americans. 
Pharmaceutical companies know that if they choose to develop 
products with high Medicaid market share, their potential reve-
nue will be lower than if most patients with the disease in ques-
tion are on Medicare or private insurance.250 
Happily, Medicaid’s reimbursement system can be recali-
brated to balance incentives for both innovation and access and 
provide additional incentives to companies who choose to invest 
in developing drugs for diseases prevalent among low-income 
Americans. One option would be to equalize down the rates that 
private payers and Medicare pay for these products, removing 
the innovation distortion in favor of diseases of affluence, while 
 
 247. Medicare Program: Part B Drug Payment Model, 81 Fed. Reg. 13230 
(Mar. 11, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 511). 
 248. See, e.g., CMS Formally Withdraws Medicare Part B Demo, AM. SOC’Y 
OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.asco.org/advocacy-policy/ 
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icare Monday: 3 Things to Know About the Government’s Medicare Payment 
Change, PHRMA (Mar. 14, 2016), http://catalyst.phrma.org/medicare-monday-3 
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 249. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2012). 
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Situation, Not a Subsidy, 5 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE 58, 59–60 (2005) (ar-
guing that tiered pricing contributes to the overall welfare of the involved par-
ties, creating a “win-win-win” situation). But where the primary patient market 
is a low-income one, tiered pricing alone may be insufficient to encourage the 
development of such products in the first instance. 
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at the same time helping mitigate our problem of drug spend-
ing.251 Another option would be to equalize up the rates that 
Medicaid pays for a particular set of products,252 providing bo-
nuses to companies who choose to invest in products primarily 
for low-income Americans.253 The simplest way to implement 
such an incentive would be to waive at least a portion of the re-
quired Medicaid rebate these companies must pay. A 23.1% or 
more254 increase in reimbursement for any particular product 
may well make a difference to companies choosing to invest in 
the first instance. 
The two previous interventions can be accomplished within 
the framework of our existing system, maintaining the linkage 
between approval and reimbursement in public programs. A 
third option would be to move toward a model like that in the 
United Kingdom as described in Part IV, going even further in 
involving payers to incentivize innovation. Paying for drugs 
based on the social value they provide, rather than on the price 
the manufacturer can demand in a linked market, might push 
companies toward different areas of research than they are cur-
rently prioritizing. This intervention would require not only de-
linkage, but also a more robust policy conversation about what 
our society is willing to pay for than we have had so far. But from 
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HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATES’ COLLECTION OF OFFSET AND SUPPLE-
MENTAL MEDICAID REBATES 5 n.19 (2014). 
 2356 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2307 
 
the perspective of not just providing access to medicines, but also 
encouraging innovation into the most needed technologies, an 
intervention along these lines may be more useful. 
  CONCLUSION   
Scholars and policymakers are rightly interested in oppor-
tunities for reform of both the FDA and health-insurance system 
in this country. Simultaneously, there is broad agreement about 
the need to take action to address the problems of drug pricing. 
Yet the failure to appreciate the linkage between FDA approval 
and insurance reimbursement has thus far stalled the develop-
ment of potential policies to solve both problems. This Article’s 
evaluation of that linkage presents options for scholars and pol-
icymakers to pursue going forward. 
